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ABSTRACT 
Heterodox mystics and heretics of any kind become 
sometim.es dangerous and other times reliable, de-
pending on political sihtations, as was the case with 
the Bektashis. The system of beliefs and practices 
.related to Bektashism seems to have corresponded 
to a kind of liberation theology, whereas the struc-
htre of Bektashi groups corresponded more or less 
to the type of religious organization conventionally 
known as charismatic groups. It becomes under-
standable therefore that their spiritual tendency 
could at times connect with and meet social, ctù-
htral and national perspectives. In htrn, when mem-
bers of the previously persecuted religious minor-
ity will acquire a degree of religious and political 
respectability within society at large, the doctrines 
of heterodoxy and libera ti on theology fade into the 
background. In the end, the heirs of the heterodox 
promoters of spirihtal reform and social movement 
htrn into followers and faithful defenders of a le-
gitimate authority. They become the spokespeople 
for an instihttionalized orthodoxy whose support 
is sought by the political regime. 
Keywords: Heterodoxy; Mysticism; Sufism; Bektashi; 
Albanian. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Religious studies specialized in Bektashism, being largely the 
domain of either Orientalists or religious scholars, remain sh1ck 
somewhere between. ethnocentrism, empiricism, historicism 
and literalism, and thereby have brought little distinctively 
anthropological and sociological analysis to bear successfully 
on the practical realities and political ideologies of religious 
prpjects. They tend to be affected by what Roland Barthes 
called the "virus of essence",1 very much orientated towards a 
folklorist paradigm of Reliktforschung,2 concemed with a search 
for the remainders of ancient times. The main interest of such 
unanalytical approach, which often piles up tmcritically all 
kinds of tri te evidence, seems only to be in correcting either the 
mistakes of Western specialists or the presumptions of local 
scholars on one or another point of details. 
This is clearly visible in recent years with the spa te of books 
published in Turkish and in Western languages about 
Bektashism and Alevism, many of them by Bektashis or sym-
pathizers of Bektashism, for which an approach will remain 
comprehensible and Iegitimate as long as it reproduces an 
apologetic discourse or it aims at revealing the essence of the 
origins of Bektashism. Sorne may offer new interpretations and 
1 (Barthes 1993 [1957]) 
2 (Bausinger 1993) 
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political slants, whlch could provide material for lively debate, 
but their insufficiency rises from overshadowing the properly 
political dimeilsions of the phenomenon, followed by a two-
fold naturalization. 
To begin with, the Bektashis are usually taken for a granted 
community once and for ali. After umpteen "preliminary" ac-
counts of sh1dies regarding Bektashlsm,3 suggestions for fur-
ther research are still advocated on the single account of the 
muh1al influences between the everlasting Bektashi and the 
different religions present in Anatolia or in the Balkans and 
their development in the course of times. A supposed substra-
tum of folk religion, the highly syncretistic character or the 
exclusive heterodox nahue of Bektashism are unquestionably 
assumed as conhnuons reaçtions to cenhtr1es of foreigv domi-
nance and antagonistic outside influences, leading to an im-
rnutable inertness and preservation of archaic features deemed 
to characterize cultural and religious life. So it is that most of 
specialist sh1dies are intended to nothing more than "convey a 
reasonable general impression that most Bektashis could ac-
cept".4 
Moreover, many works regard Bektashism as self-explana-
tory, expressing 'academically' what the Bektashis themselves 
daim 'religiously'. They are always declared victims par excel-
lence, systematically oppressed by political or religious authori-
tarian regimes. On the other hand, they are constantly made 
out the bestpreservers ofboth local cultural and universalmoral 
values. 
If Islamic brotherhoods have always occupied an important 
place in the social, economie, and political life from the old 
3(Kressing 2002) 
4(Norlon 2001) 
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Ottoman Empire to modem Turkey, throughout Turkish his-
tory, the Bektashi have never failed to daim their foundations 
as exclusive centres of etùture and education. In the way, the 
Bektashis and other dervishes have come to be seen as the pro-
viders of many things. They converted nomads from shaman-
ism to Islam, extended social and emotional support to new 
converts, particularly the Janjssaries, provided food and shel-
ter to travellers, proposed concrete saints for poptùar piety to 
focus on, and at the end of the nineteenth century, constihlted 
a source of support to the Yotmg Turks and Turkish national-
ism. Many painstaking efforts have been made to show that 
certain Bektashis "could provide a source of legitimation 
against an established govemment" or even "prove the exist-
ence of a civil society in the Ottoman Empire".5 
In present days, in most situations, the Bektashis, defined 
against Sunni Islam, set themselves forth as essentially modern 
and democrat, overall defenders of human rights and gender 
equality. Tolerance, love, and respect for ail men and women 
created in God's image and in whom God manjfests himself, 
regardless of race, religion, or nation, as weil as hatred of hy-
pocrisy and inner religion of the heart, help for those in need, 
kindness, honesty, solidarity, equality, fraternity, freedom, de-
mocracy, and the like, aU are frequent messages that Bektashis 
seek to convey as liDique humanistic traits of their ideology. 
Certain scholars on Bektashism have given their support to 
or reproduced these essentializing identity and ideological dis-
courses without questioning them. At first, the relative benevo-
lence of Western scholarship towards the Bektashis is partly 
explained, as 1 argued elsewhere,6 by the tendency of sorne 
5(Faroqhi 1995) 
6(Doja 2004a) 
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scholars like Frances Trix "going native"/ or even by the sym-
pathy the Bektashis themselves may inspire because of their 
politicaily correct character. The Bektashis answer especiaily 
weil to certain academie or political as weil as cosmopolitan or 
nationalist expectations, to the point of their daims being largely 
considered, if not progressive, at least legitimate. Moreover, the 
example of Bektashis seems to pertinently illustrate the meet-
ing of Western academie projections with the political inter-
ests of a religious movement, a shortcoming denounced with 
accuracy by Elise Massicard in the case of Alevism in contem-
porary Turkey.8 Western academia has often reproduced the 
Bektashi historical vulgate, making of its protagonists succes-
sively the promoters of the nation, the allies of secularity or the 
spearheads of democracy, perhaps for the same political or 
ideological reasons than their fellow Bektashis. 
Consequently, we must reverse the question and precisely 
get rid of that apologetic vision of the origin and essence on 
which many are so enthusiast, in order to be able to explain 
why at a given time the community of a religious identity be-
cornes a relevant medium for spiritual, cultural, social, or po-
litical mobilization. What the Bektashis hold for their identity 
and their history must be treated as a discursive ideological 
construction, for we can reveal their possible situational rel-
evance or their sociological and political determinants. To build 
a relatively autonomous analysis of Bektashi discourses, it is 
necessary to study the context that produces such rituahzed 
discourses and practices, to convert the interpretations of the 
actors into data to be interpreted, and to incorporate in the 
7(Trix 1993) 
8(Massicard 2005) 
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subject of study their attempts to organize a memory and their 
strategies to balance or reverse power relationships. Against 
most available research on Bektashism, it is time to move from 
the hlstorical account of the dervish units and their symbolic 
practices towards the analysis of the political and sociological 
dynamics of their production and reproduction: Far from po-
liticizing and ethnicizing Bektaslhi issues, a critical and ana-
lytical approach must reveal and de-essentialize the hidden 
ideological undercurrents of discourses mobilizing around re-
ligious identity and political projc~cts. 
A different picture may result, indeed, from the basic as-
sumption that different types of social organisation and ways 
of thinking are compatible with t:he political establishment to 
varying degrees and react to it i.Jn. different ways. Within the 
social sciences, Max Weber already made the difference in 
worldly success between the Catholic and the Protestant world-
view central to his Protestant Et/tic and the Spirit of Capitalism,9 
whereas anthropology has been constantly interested in the 
ways that social organisations might be compared, emphasiz-
ing that the investigation of living phenomena are absolutely 
reliant upon comparing and establishing the differences be-
tween relevant groups.10 
9(Weber 2002 [1905]) 
10A few exceptions apart, only texts writtEm in a dervish milieu contain infor-
mation about holy men and their doings, and these texts were written not 
for historical but religious purposes. However, in recent studies by con-
temporary Turkish scholars, such as the thorough commentaries on the 
Vilayet-Name of Hadji Bektash or the comprehensive study of pre-lslamic 
motifs in Bektashi legend (Golpinarli 1958; Ocak 1983), a narrative or group 
of stories will be foUowed in their passage through different literatures, 
white the researcher tries to reconstructt the political reasons, in the broad-
est sense, why the narrative was put together in one fashion in a given 
context and in quite a different mannei somewhere else. Rediscovering an 
old experience meaning that many apparently non-political acis have a 
political dimension, authors attempti1ng these kinds of analyses are no 
13 
Evenhtally for many, as l argued elsewhere,u there are per-
haps the modem views of the nation-state and ail of its institu-
tionalized mythologies that have confused, erased, desecrated 
and demolished our understanding of the local definitions and 
categories of group identity1 as articulated in everyday life. 
Whereas history is regarded as a technique that makes it pos-
sible to reveal the origin, and thus the very rneaning of the real 
definition and the true nature of Bektashism, beyond this mean-
ing, what is finally at issue is the comprehension of Bektashism 
into the nation and into the categories of negotiation and dec-
laration of identity and othemess. In these conditions, many 
supposedly weil established facts concerning historical devel-
opments of Bektashi doctrine and organization have to be se-
verely contested and questioned, as resulting from the deliber-
ate use of myths for political, ideological and religions purposes. 
A series of historical incidents like the sudden appearance 
and rapid spread of the Bektashi group of dervishes during the 
thirteenth and fomteenth centuries, their transformation into 
a powerful Sufi order during Ottoman times, and the develop-
ments to which Bektashism has been subjected in late Otto-
man period as weil as in independent Albania and in modem 
Turkey, still remain issues that reqtùre an explanation. One of 
the main reasons that a thorough critical analysis using ex-
longer concerned with the concrete details of dervish !ife, but with the 
great de ba tes of the time, su ch as the tension between orthodox and hetero-
dox world views or between the mystics and holy men who have accepted 
integration within mainstream Muslim society and the mystic who re-
fused such an accommodation. This novel type of elaboration is very at-
tractive, particularly given the ordinarily pedestrian proceedings of many 
Ottoman historians. Yet the danger of arbitrarily attributing to fifteenth-
century writers of dervish legends, motivations which stem indirect! y from 
late twentieth-century concerns is not to be minimized. 
11(Doja 2004b, 2005) 
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planatory insight from investigation in historical anthropology 
and sociology may prove to be important is to combine the 
study of Bektashism at once as a creed within Islam, as a kind 
of liberation theology, as a quasi-political movement and part-
ner suited to national movements, and as an ideological power 
base to reassert political authority. This means that the discus-
sion must deal with the main groups within society in a coher-
ent analytical framework in terms of ideology, organization, 
govemment and opposition, something that is often omitted in 
discussions of Ottoman society. 
1 do not seek here to reassess the arguments over the avail-
able Bektashi material, nor am I able to treat in anything but 
the most superficial way the fascina ting but complex world of 
Ottoman history. I do believe, however, that we are immensely 
in need for a comprehensive analytical mode! to tmderstand 
the meaning and purpose of such a coherent ideology subsumed 
under the rubric of religion, a model that must explain indeed 
a great deal of the diverse religious paths that I believe are char-
acteristic of the modern world today. To this aim, this article, 
taking the development of Bektashism in Albania as a working 
example, is part of a larger critical and explanatory analysis 
aimed at revealing that the variations in the course of 
Bektashism's history probably best exemplify such a transfor-
mational model involving many of its complex theological, ideo-
logical, cultural, social, and political aspects. 
Without being necessarily concemed with genea!ogy, my 
position is anthropological, i.e. seeking by a comparative ap-
proach to benefit from the discontinuity between the distinct 
historical vicissitudes of Bektashism for discovering typologi-
cal homologies which would attest they are different realiza-
tions of a similar pattern and make it possible to disèover a 
structure of common fundamental constraints to a spiritual 
15 
tendency to meet social, cultural, national, and political per-
spectives. The search for this cornmon background thus does 
not erase the differences and their distinctiveness, to the loca-
tion of which aims an anthropologically informed approach to 
history, since it is their reality that only makes it possible to 
elucidate the homologies. 
Heterodox religions movements and the institution of new 
forms of religion, as in the case of mystical orders of Islam like 
the Bektashis, are decisive for tmderstanding the history of re-
ligions in Southeast European area. This in turn could bring 
forth insights for understanding the current situation in which 
group identities are being negotiated and redefined. While 
mystics do not partake in, or directly express class struggle, 
their heterodoxy, over and beyond the intensity and power of 
their beliefs or the radical character of their opposition to the 
established religion, did always and still necessarily does crys-
tallize political, social ahd cultural discontent which is, in turn, 
very often either ethnicized along na tionalist lines or politicized 
along power forces or both. 
The point is not only~ that religion as a cultural symbolic 
system uses political and ether resources that show a power 
base. More irnportantly, religion, in its own field, has rather a 
symbolic structure, which, as Bourdieu put it,12 reproduces the 
distribution of resources and power from the non-symbolic 
mundane field in a transformed form. To better appreciate this 
we must arguably begin by attempting to comprehend the 
underlying significance of the stntctures of religious represen-
tation and mediation, and the implication of their change in 
support of either cultural orderings or order-questioning 
projects in human society. 
12 (Bourdieu 1971) 
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BACKGROUND 
The origin of the Bektashl order of dervishes belongs to the 
many Sufi movements of Islam that developed in the Middle 
East from the eleventh and twelfth centuries onwards. 13 At 
this time a number of missionary precursors, known as the 
Saints of Khorassan, infiltrated Anatolia where they paved the 
way to the dervish groups like the Bektashis. The name of the 
order is derived from the legendary founder Hadji Bektash, 
even though, as in many other cases concerning Sufi 
hagiography, Hadji Bektash was not the actual founder of the 
order but a patron saint chosen at a later date. He is hlmself 
supposed to have com e originally from Khorassan in north-
east Iran and lived in Anatolia in the second half of the thir-
teenth century.14 The description of his Vilnyet-Name corre-
sponds to that of the typical wandering dervishes known as 
Iranian Kalenders or Anatolian Abdals in the thirteen th and 
fourteenth cenhrries. 15 The dervishes who followed him are 
called Abdal and from the very start, he is called 'leader' (Pir) 
of Anatolian Abdals. 
Apparently Bektashism must have started d uring the thir-
teenth and fourteenth cenhliies as a mixture of shamanism 
13 (Karamustafa 1994) 
14(Melikoff 1998) 
15 (Ocak 1995) 
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inherited from the Turkic tribes ofK.horassan, mixed with popu-
lar beliefs in such ~ way asto appeal to villagers and the lower 
class of the Anatolian population. In the region of origin, 
Bektashism must have mingled with local beliefs, and it is not 
surprising that besides different Sufi doctrines and practices, 
many religious traditions may have contributed to the devel-
opment and appearance of Bektashism, including ancient 
Turkic elements preserving pre-Islamic and non-Islamic beliefs 
and customs originating in shamanism, Buddhism, 
Manichaeism, Christianity and antique religions.16 In Anatolia, 
and later in the Balkans, Bektashism encountered further 
Neoplatonist, Christian and Nestorian influences. Being recep-
tive to many elements of these religions, the Bektashis also in-
corporated anthropomorphic and cabbalistic doctrines of let-
ter and number symbolism that can be traced to Hurufism,17 
combined with an extrernist Shiite credo that linked devotion 
to the divinity of Ali with beliefs in anthropomorphism, the 
manifestation of God in human form, reincarnation and 
metempsychosis. 18 
Such a considerable number of doctrines and practices of 
heterogeneous origins has lead to heated disputes between 
specialists over the prevalence of one or another influence 
and finally to daim that the Bektashi Order did not have a 
well defined theology, that it could accommodate much lo-
cal influence, and that its fundamental character is an all-
encompassing syncretism. 19 Many authors have regarded 
Bektashism as an extemallayer over pre-Islamic, Christian 
1
"(Birge 1937 [1994]) 
17(Melikoff 1992: 163-174; Pupuvic & Vei11slein 1995: 39-53) 
18(Melikoff 2001: 97-120) 
'~(Melikoff 1992; Popovic & Veinstein 1995) 
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or other beliefs.20 In Turkish scholarship, however, from the 
very start Western studies were severely criticized for hav-
ing attributed the specificities of Bektashism to Christian tra-
ditions/1 and Turkish nationalists and folklorists have in-
sisted on the Turkish origins of Bektashism. Still, a prevail-
ing syncretism between ancient, pre-Islamic Turkic, and Is-
lamic elements in Bektashi lore is argued again on the ac-
count of the encounter of pre-Islamic Turks with 'high reli-
gions' in Central Asia and the position of the Bektashis at 
20In the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, early European scholars more 
particularly found in Bektashism a worship that they linked to crypta-
Christian traditions surviving in Anatolia, which would also explain the 
special missionary interest in their regard (Kieser 2001). Sorne perceived 
parallels, among others, to the Christian Trinity and the Twelve Disciples 
or between Christian devotion to the Virgin Mary and Bektashi devotion 
to Fatima, wife of Ali and daughter of Mohammed, have led many com-
mentators to presume that these features were taken from Christiarùty and 
simply given an Islamic superficial veneer. Such syncretism is further 
claimed to have made Bektashism acceptable to many non-Muslims who 
would have found the austere teachings of Sunni orthodoxy unattractive. 
ln this opinion, most au thors aie still tempted to think that Bektashism 
tumed into a refuge for many Christians and that the syncretistic forms of 
sectarian Islam became an appropria te bridge for the transition from Chris-
tiarùty to Islam. 
The many traits of Christianity that had been incorporated i.nto 
Bektashism and other Sufi groups are supposed to have contributed sig-
nificantly to the shaping of popular Islamic beliefs, thus facilitahng the 
conversion to fslam of the Christian populations in Anatolia and the Balkans, 
which are assumed to have been previously only superficially Christian-
ized. ln Eastern Europe, for instance, other than sorne Albanian, Bosnian, 
and Bulgarian groups, ail remained generally faithful ta Eastern Christian 
Orthodoxy, but those who did convert to Islam under the Ottoman Empire 
chose the Bektashi interpretation of Islam. 
One of the general tenets of Bulgarian scholarship, in particular, has 
maintained for long the Bogomil hypothesis (see Gramatikova 2001), which 
associated the Bektashi ethnically with the Bulgarian component and reli-
giously with the Christian BogomiJ heresy, thus presenting them as de-
scendants of either Old Bulgarians or Islamicized Christians. 
21 (Koprulu 1926) 
19 
• 
the crossroads of different cultures, while the ques tion of 
shamanic remainders is henceforth claimed to be far less 
important than usually assumed.22 This official version, still 
current, is taken over willy-nilly by many Western special-
ists without questioning its actual relevance. 
Another general daim is that the Bektashis preserved many 
traits of oppositional movements and heretic groups, and 
shaped them into a synthesis dtuing times of a mutua1 pen-
etration of Turkic and Byzantine culhrral traits. There is clear 
evidence for the participation of Hadji Bektash himself and his 
adherents in the Trucoman uprisings against Seljuk rule in 1239-
1240, the so-called Babaî revoit. 23 However, there remains prob-
ably very little resemblance between the Turkic beliefs of Hadji 
Bektash's time in tlurteenth century and those that formed the 
heterodox but sophisticated doctrines at the trun of sixteenth 
century when the Bektashis were organized as an established 
Order of dervishes. 
While the complexities of the Bektashi past may never be 
known precisely, it appears agreed by specialist historians that 
they were often tribal or nomadlc communities who inhabited 
that uneasy geographical region between the central power of 
the Ottomans, on the one hand, and the gradually more ortho-
dox Safavid Iran on the other. While 'they were exposed to many 
different currents of Islamic thought, one of the most effective 
was a form of revolutionary mystical leadership espoused by 
lranian Shiism, which earned for Kizilbash-Bektashism to be 
characterized after this period by a distinctive Shiite charac-
ter. This brought the Kizilbash into violent conflict with the 
Ottoman state, itself ever more inclined towards Sunnism.24 It 
12(0cak 1983) 
23 (Koprulu 1993 [1922): 76-77) 
2~(Kehi-Bodrogt 1988: 42-47) 
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resulted too in widespread, brutal massacres and forced con-
version, a persecution that reached its peak during the time of 
Sultan Selim I (1512-1520). As a result of mass deportations of 
this time from Anatolia into the European provinces, the 
Kizilbash and other heretics integrated into the Bektashi order 
must have laid ground for the presence of Shiite and hetero-
dox elements in southeast Europe. 
Parallel to the tumultuous Kizilbash developments in early 
sixteenth century, under the explicit patronage of the Otto-
man Sultan Bayezid II (1481-1512), a reforming trend was in-
troduced with the appointment of Balim Sultan (1473-1516) at 
the headship of the order of Bektashis. Formerly leader of an 
important Bektashi foundation in Dimetoka near Edirne in 
Thrace, he took up his post at the Bektashi headquarters of 
Hacibektash Village in Anatolia around the year 1501, taking 
finn control and in trod ucing a large degree of uniformity, which 
earned him to be revered as the Order' s second fatmding saint. 
Shortly thereafter, the Bektashis astonishingly established them-
selves as one of the most influential dervish orders during the 
Ottoman period from the seventeenth and eighteenth cenht-
ries. 
Primarily colonizing dervishes in charge of Turkicization and 
Islamicization of countries conquered by the fust Ottoman stù-
tans,25 not only were the Bektashis an instrument of the Otto-
man propaganda in these cotmtries, but they enjoyed a certain 
political importance in the Ottoman Empire, and even ùnposed 
themselves on sorne weak or mystic sultans, especially when 
they were closely connected with the Janissary troops, the in-
strument of Ottoman military power. It is considered that the 
Bektashis constantly encouraged and dominated the Janissaries 
25(Melikoff 1992: 115-137) 
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by traditionally providing their religious guides. This elective 
affinity is somehow attributed to bath the supposed Christian 
substratum of Bektashism and to the widespread and long-
lasting Ottoman practice of conscripting Christian youths into 
the Janissary Corps. To what degree, however, the rise of the 
Bektashj arder can be attributed toits links with the Janissaries 
is a matter still open for investigation, as disputation rages 
among specialists about the role of Bektashis in the formation 
of Janissaries as an elite army. 
When after repeated revolts and rebellions the Janissary 
troops were finally dismissed in 1826 with resisting forces be-
ing massacred, this meant that also the Bektashis were subject 
to state s uppression and had to move to the margins of the 
Empire. A hundred years later, in the modem Turkey after 
World War 1, the Bektashi Order was again subject to state 
prosecution tmtil 1925 when it was officially abolished alto-
gether with the other dervish orders in the newly founded 
Turkish Republic. These trials and tribulations allowed 
Bektashism to develop again a non-conformist and antinomian 
stance to the point of being often depicted, despite its deep 
mystical roots, as a progressive current within Islam, close to 
Westernizing and modernizing trends. 
In a very broad generalization, it has been argued a "his-
torical bipartition" between the Bektashis who were tradition-
ally urbanized and educated and the Alevis who lived in vil-
lages, the former having spread in the Balkans and the latter 
remaining in the Anatolian cotmtryside.26 Bektashism is there-
fore often considered as a kind of 'purified' lslam, what an 
older generation of social anthropologists might have termed 
::b(Melikof( 2001: 37~) 
22 
the 'great tradition' of the urban and organized Bektashi Or-
der against the 'little tradition' of the nrral and less-educated 
Alevi or Kizilbash. To show, however, that modem Alevi and 
Bektashi groups have much more in common than they have 
differences, the Alevis themselves will often talk about 'Alevi-
Bektashi' creed, culture, or traditions. 
In the persecution clirnate during Ottoman-Safavid wars in 
sixteenthcentury, the isolated Kizilbash-Alevis in nuai Anatolia 
developed traditions, practices, and doctrines that by the earl y 
seventeenth century rnarked them as closed, autonornous reli-
gious communities, opposed to all forrns of extemal religion.27 
Alevism used to be and to sorne extent still continues to be a 
social stigrna in contemporary Turkey, and many Alevis have 
atternpted to hide their backgrormds once they had moved to 
large cities. 
The relationship with the Sunni majority remains one of 
mutual suspicion and prejudice, dating back to the Ottoman 
period. Sunnis have accused Alevis of heresy, heterodoxy, re-
bellion, betrayal and immorality. Alevis, on the other hand, 
view themselves as the true preservers of authentic Turkish 
culture, religion, and language. More importantly, Alevism is 
claimed to adapt to modernity because it is supposed to be flex-
ible and tolerant, out of a natural sense of equality and justice. 
It is much more suitable for it includes traits supposedly sup-
pressed by Sunnism, which would thereby not be true Islam 
but an aberration that opposes free and independent thought 
by its strict legalism, seen as reactionary, bigoted, fanatic, in-
tolerant, domineering, and antidemocratic. 
More importantly, in the last three decades we witnessed in 
contemporary Ttukey what came to be known as an Alevi cul-
27(Kehi-Bodrogi 1988: 38 ~7) 
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tural revival, leading to issues of Bektashi or Alevi heterodoxy 
being heatedly politicized and etlmicized.28 Spearheaded by 
the new, educated Alevi elite, Alevi cultural associations are 
established, foundations and trusts organized, old Bektashi 
convents reopened, saints' tombs rebuilt, rituals restored and 
re-invented. The overall revival places emphasis on Alevism as 
a cultural and religious heritage in an effort to reconstruct Alevi 
culture, cmrumunity, and identity, but also to artictùate Alevi 
collective interests towards the modern state and demand 
equality with the Sunni majority. In an ongoing process of ne-
gotiation due to the participation of leaders representing dif-
ferent traditions and trends, many intellectuals made contri-
butions towatrds a systematization of Alevi belief and a flood 
of new books and journals reflects the efforts to reinvent 
Alevism. 
Certain actors interpret Alevism as the specifically Turkish 
form of Islam, that is, the 'true' Islam rid of Arab influences. 
Alevism, according to them, is a Turkish-Anatolian religion 
combining Islam with elements of Turkish culture. An etlmic 
dimension is often emphasized, making Alevism a support for 
Turkish identity or assimilating it to a Kurdish authentic phe-
nomenon. More generally, this view sees Alevism as the au-
thentic expression of an Anatolian culture and civilization, and 
in contrast to a specifie Turkish na tionalism sets up an Ana tolian 
ctùtural mosaic, which includes many other groups allied with 
the Alevis against Ottoman oppression. 
While many remained Kemalist and hoped that the state 
would officially legitimize the Bektashi arder, the new genera-
tion showed a strong tendency to think of Alevism as a politi-
cal opposition rather than a religious tradition. Partly due to 
18(Kehl-Bodrogi 1992; Vorhoff 1995; Shankland 2003; Massicard 2005) 
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the severe repression of the left and pôrtly as a response to the 
imposition of a conservative brand of Smmi Islam by the state, 
the yotmg generation joined extreme leftist parties. Working 
for a radical restructuring of society, they viewed ail 'reaction-
ary' elements which tried to assimilate them into mainstream 
Sunni life as enemies, reinterpreting bath historicaJ opposition 
to Su.nnism in terms of class struggle and Alevism in socialist 
and Marxist idiom that seemed to have an affinity to Bektashi 
ideals of equality and traditions of revolt and opposition to the 
state.29 They viewed their religion as a positive political and 
social revoltl tionary ideology fighting against oppression and 
evil on behalf of the poor and marginalized sectors of society. 
They thus defi.ned Alevism in the tradition of democracy or as 
a culture of rebellion, based on the Kizilbash revolts under Ot-
toman Empire or on the massive Alevi engagement to the left 
in contemporary Turkey. Considering that Ali was the defender 
of the poor and oppressed, and that Hassan and Hussein were 
the first martyrs in the cause of the dispossesscd, they presented 
Alevism as having always led the fight for liberation against 
ali tyranny, while reactionary Sunnism served the rich and 
powerful dominant elites. 
Still, most Alevis follow the Kemalist secularist ideology and 
as Alevism becomes more secular, the conception of God be-
cornes almost entirely intemalized and conflated with the per-
son in worldly life.30 Thus, the Sufi cry of ecstasy conflating 
God and the self, regarded as the pinnacle of profound undcr-
standi.ng and conveyed often through a mass of complicated 
symbolism and secret doctrine, becornes camp letely routinized, 
a casuaJ but as$ertive daim to place the individual and their 
z<I(Vorhoff 1995) 
W(Shankland 2003) 
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desires at the centre of the tmiverse. This shift can lead to a 
profotmdly peaceful humanism, and frequently does. It may 
also lead to a notable phenomenon whereby individuals, or 
sometimes whole Alevi associations, may interpret Alevism as 
an international culhrre. They stress only the liberal and hu-
manistic values of Alevism as a world-view, downplaying its 
religious connotations. In this case they would deny that 
Alevism is [slamic, and claim the origins lie in pre-Islamic reli-
gions systems, stressing their links to similar groups, allassumed 
to be fragments of the original community. For these people, 
being a Alevi is widened to something that is common to ali 
humanity, not restricted to a chosen group of believers within 
a wider creed, and in effect, not even to do with religion. 
On the other side, from later developments of Bektashism 
tmder Ottoman Empire it became obvions that Albania often 
served as a kind of exile for the adherents of the Bektashi order, 
and there is general agreement that after their noticeable pres-
ence in the second half of seventeenth century, Bektashism gradu-
ally became more and more deeply rooted in Albania during the 
end of nineteenth centu.ry. Besicles the fact that the Bektashis in 
Albania were spared the suppression that the or~er had to face 
in Anatolia and other core areas of the Ottoman Empire after 
1826, another reason may be the specifie Albanian religious cli-
mate,31 on which accmmt the establishment of Bektashism in 
Albania has deserved special attention as a religion that is sup-
posed to have incorporated so many archaic traits and devel-
oped in Albania an independent character which serves as an-
ether paradigmatic example for forces of ctùtural inertness and 
political resistance.32 Because of the concordance to its panthe-
istic and 1morthodox character, it is generally assumed that the 
ll(see Doja 2000b) 
Jl(Kressing 2002) 
26 
acceptance of Bektashism in Albania was largely facilitated by 
the fact that Bektashi syncretism already combined pre-Islamic 
and Shiite elements with Christian elements. 
When Bektashlsm established itself in Albania, the argument 
goes that these beliefs must have been quickly replaced hy Al-
banian popular traditions. Arguably Bektashism carne to be 
perceived as the purest expression of Albanian rcligiosity and 
the conservatory of AJbanian traditions, to the point of being 
considered as the only truly national religion, and it is no sur-
prise if Bektashis might have played an important role in the 
national awaking of Albania in the second half of the nine-
teenth century. Spedalists speak of the 'solidification' of a prop-
erly Albanian Bektashism in the western confines of Ottoman 
Empire, with elements of Albanian na tionalism being integra ted 
into Bektashi doctrine, especially in the southem parts of the 
country where most of the Bektashi lodges were situated.33 
Whether religious poli tics was instrumental in mobilizing ideo-
logical myths or actual action, on the eve of the Albanian inde-
pendence, the Bektashis were munericnlly important and polin-
cali y influential, and Albanian Bektashi dervishes were fre-
quently found in convents outside their own cotmtry. Many high 
Bektashi dignitaries, including sorne times even the supreme leader 
of the central institution, are often thought to be of Albanian 
origin. When Turkey decreed the definitive abolition of all mys-
tic orders in 1925, the Bektashi general headquarters once again 
took refuge in Albania. At any case it became quite clear that a 
decisive national Albanian character of the order was further 
fostered in the course of the twentieth century, when Bektashism 
became officially recognized by the AJbanian state as the fourth 
legal denominational congregation of the country. 
33(Popovic & Veinstein 1996: 470) 
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FROM LIBERATION THEO LOG Y 
TO HIERARCHICAL SURRENDER 
The Bektashis were one of the many bands of believers seek-
ing to achieve the goal of most Su fis, that is, rn ys tic union with 
God. When mystical unJon with God was not quite the goal 
sought, it was the cult of the miracle-working saints, living or 
dead, through worship of their tombs, which prevailed in the 
religious fervour of these heretic and heterodox groupings of 
dervish religiosity.ln these conditions, the intensity of religious 
life prevailed over its extension, and salvation became a per-
sona! affair rather than a relationship with sorne grace-dispens-
ing agency. Participation in the spiritual commtmity comforted 
the individual need to oppose or transcend society, raising one 
temporarily into timeless supernatural experience. Heterodox 
or heretic rnovements and mystical orders like Bektashism em-
bodied in themselves the whole mysterium Jascinans of the age, 
the revealed, esoteric, mysti.cal, and emotional religion. Their 
ftmction was to mediate the inner aspect of religious experi-
ence. 
Regarding their organization, broadly speaking and aside 
from the peculiarities that may be accmmted for by the politi-
cal and economie systems of the countries in which they spread, 
the initial structures specifie to their communities are sugges-
tive of the early Christian groups of the fust centuries, as re-
lated in the Acts of Apostles and the Epistles of St Patù. Earlier 
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Sufi and Bektashi groups had been linked by enthusiasm, corn-
mon devotions, and methods of spiritual discipline, with the 
aim of stripping the so1ù and elimina ting self to attain vision of 
divine reality. They were therefore integrated by spirit and aim 
rather than by any formal organization, and were in fact very 
loose organizations, more or less anarchical, closed, and secret 
groups or circles of initiates who showed no interest in sharing 
any collective discipline or dogma. At earl y stages of Sufi move-
ments until about the thirteenth century, the master is not 
mentioned at all,34 even though the respect for the spiritual 
freedom of each member necessitated regtùations for the corn-
mon life. The idea of a spiritual community was formed in such 
groups as a basis for their common life, and the .mas ter remained 
essentially a guide in spiritual matters, but not an autocrat of a 
convent, allegedly acting as an intermediary between believers 
and God. 
Hadji Bektash hirnself, for instance, carried out a life of a 
wandering hennit during most of his life and he did not seem 
to have been a prominent character in religious matters. He 
did not even seek to found any order orto have disciples dur-
ing his life. 35 He remained the eponym of an order he did not 
found himself, and was guite unconscious of the impact he 
was going to have, his success being achieved after him and in 
spi te of him. Although Bektaslùsm had spread over a wide area 
and gained many adherents, it is considered that "before 1500 
both the order and its teachings developed in a random fash-
ion". In addition, specialists are led to consider that "this vague-
ness of belief was paralleled by lack of tmiformity in the ir orga-
nization", even though they normally attribute this character 
3-l(Trimingham 1971 [1998]: 167) 
.35(Melikoff 1998) 
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to the supposed Bektashi all-encompassing syncretism and 
"readiness to incorpora te a wide range of ùeliefs and practices, 
which made it dillicult to define precisely what the order stood 
for" .311 
My position, following innovative approaches within the 
field regarding early Sufism in the eleventh and twelfth centu-
ries}7 is rather to consider Bektashism fust as a reaction against 
the extemal rationalization of religion in law and systematic 
theology. Essentially, like ether early Sufi groupings, in its ear-
lier developments during the thi.rteenth and fourteenth centu-
ries, Bektashism corresponded to the sphere of religious expe-
rience which developed from common experience ofboth spiri-
tual knowledge and suffering, while running paralleJ and of-
ten in opposition to the orthodox institution and the rnainstream 
of Islamk consciousness derived from prophetie revelation. 
Making deliberate use of altered states of consciousness, 
such as ecstatic dance (sema) and recitation (zikr), which are 
still a common feature of Bektashi practices, Bektashism must 
have aimed first at spiritual freedom whereby human intrinsic 
and intuitive spiritual senses could be aUowed hill scope, over 
and against instituted religion as based on authority and legal-
istic morality. It must have been an assertion of a person's right 
to pursue a !ife of contemplation, seeking contact with the ulti-
mate source of being and reality. In reaction to the expression 
of religion as a communitarian matter, Bektashism was a sub-
jective expression of persona! religion, directed at an individual 
and direct experience of the presence of God. Finding inspira-
tion in interpretations revealing the 'inner meaning' behind the 
literai sense of sacred texts, the craving for spiritual satisfac-
X>(Norton 2001 : 171) 
37(Trimingham 1971 [1998); Karamustala 1994) 
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tion led these early Sufi Bektashis into a non-conformist reli-
gious experience where there was no room for a clear-cut sepa-
ration between humans and the divinity. 
Legalistic orthodox religion fulfilled a social far more than a 
spiritual function and had little to offer to human spiritual 
needs, being not concemed with the exercise of a pastoral of-
fice and having neither the means nor the agencies for emo-
tional outlet and few for free ù1tercession. In Sunnism, like other 
formal religions prescriptions, the commandments and rules 
regarding disciplinary practices, such as praying, fasting, for-
hidden food and other austerities belong to the Law which the 
followers are forced to ohey by complying with formalities and 
dogmas. In Bektashism, like other early dervish groups, the 
initial dogged individualism was reinforced by initiation into a 
claimed higher degree of knowledge and awareness, for a fol-
lower no longer to be bound by the formalistic austere dernands 
and prohibitions of the Islamic faith comprehended within the 
orthodox, codified, and system a tic theology such as propounded 
by the legalist Sunni dogma. 
The daim of having learned and understood the essence 
and core of religion led Bektashis to personal interpretations of 
the doctrines and traditions. Claiming to be enlightened enough 
to follow the Way by obeying the voice of conscience they cotùd 
thereby proceed alone by carrying out the religions cornmand-
mentwith a tendency to reduce salvation and rebirth to a purely 
internai operation, to the point of denying the need for rituals. 
They achtally rejected any external display or collective wor-
ship for their religion, thus repudiating especially the externat 
forrns of Islam and its five pillars. For Bektashis, worship is a 
secret affair, peculiar to initia tes who are that inner purity and 
sincerity are more important than outward ablution and ritual. 
They firmly believe that it is essential not to unveil the secret, 
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that they are responsible before God and not before their other 
fellow hurnans, that sin involves doing things surreptitiously 
rather than in public, and so on. The premise that underlies 
the distinctive character of the Bektashis is the purification of 
the human heart and spirit which is the fundamental purpose 
of ali religious rites. They daim that this purified state is attain-
able without following either the Sunni or the Shiite forms of 
worship. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the Bektashis will systematically 
be criticized for both their fanaticism and liberalism, insofar as 
their heterodoxy resided in the non-observance of canonical 
rituals. They do not practice at set times the five daily prayers 
(namnz) or the ritual ablutions (abdes), nor do they observe the 
fast of Ramadan or believe in the necessity of the pilgrimage to 
Mecca. They interpret the Koran in an esoteric, allegorie, and 
symbolic rather than litera! manner and appeal to Koranic 
authority rather less than do most other dervish groups. Ap-
propriate verses are read at weddings and funerals, but other-
wise they are happier to lis ten to the verses of their poets con-
veying their own responses to the sacred texts. On a more for-
mallevel, they are criticized for their tolerance of alcoholic bev-
erages and the presence of women during ceremonies, as well 
as for indulging in orgies or sexuallicenses and of ali the slan-
ders to which eccentrics of all sorts had been subjected during 
the centuries.38 
In the face of economie, social and ideological upheaval, 
the most radical mystics have always adopted attitudes culti-
vating distance not simply from legalist religion but from main-
stream society as weil. Their watchword was the desire to be 
outsider in a world claimed to be corrupt and led astray by 
38(Müller 1967) 
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bad guides. Mystics of this sort were not simply opponents c,f 
the ruling classes, they were intent on going against social norms 
as weiL Alternatively, whenever faced with drastic social 
change, people will systematically tum from the possibility 01 
a transcendentaL orthodox God towards an internalized sense 
of spirih.1al self that is far less reliant upon the formalized in~ 
nùcation within the framework of traditional religions ritua.l 
than that exemplified by the legalist Sunni Islam. This is, of 
course, an extremely abrupt summary of a particular inclina-
tion that appears to have been active within the Bektashis, 
emphasized especially in the course of his tory at each time when 
they have been subjected to political state oppression. 
This must have happened specifically in the early times of 
Bektashism in thirteenth and fourteenth cenh.tries, during thte 
Ottoman-Safavid wars in the first half of sixteenth centwy, 
after the suppression of}anissary troops in the first half of rune-
teenth century, or after the abolition of dervish orders in the 
first half of twentieth century.39 Il is this emphasis that ha:s 
made it possible for the Bektashis to achieve a close sense of 
identity successively with the Young Turk movement, with th•e 
Albanian national awakening in the second hatf of nineteenlh 
cenrury or with the early Turkish nationalism in the fust quar-
ter of twentieth century. The same emphasis must have also 
interacted with more recent nationalist ideals and left-wing 
'progressive' political philosophy that are even more unstable, 
as has been often the case with the Alevi revival in contempo-
rary Turkey, or with the 'democratie' processes of post-com-
munist transformations in contemporary Albania. 
Among groups which possess a radicalized interpretation 
of the social world, one that relies upon, and feeds off, the com-
l'l(Doja 2006) 
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munist ideal of the inherently illegitimate state, this emphasis 
may become less a route to toJeration than one of hardened 
bittemess as to the perceived lack of respect that is paid to the 
person in modern society. Indeed, if a group or organisation 
both lose faith in the state and respect for divine authority, 
they may turn more casüy to imposing their ritual practice and 
anti-authoritarian motifs into the service of a revolutionary 
ideology. Viewed in this light, the religious experience of the 
Bektashis presented conceivable characteristics of a liberation 
theology, while the structure of thcir groups corresponded more 
or less to the type of religious organization conventionally 
known as charismatic groups. 
ORGANIZATIONAL 
TRANSFORMATIONS 
One of the ftmctions of religion as a cultural system is to 
serve as a media ting representation between powerless earthly 
creatures and an all-powerftù God located in heaven. Media-
tion wotùd make it possible for the heavenly divinity to inter-
cede on behalf of humans on earth. The assumption here is 
that different covenan.tal structures of divine mediation must 
correspond to specifie stages in the development of Bektashism 
and Sufism. The following assumption is that it is possible to 
gain a different meaning if a media ting hierarchy is to be found 
in the conceptualization of the divinity or in the organization 
of the worldly htunan society. 
Clearly, if there are mediators between htunans and God, . 
such as the Sufi and Bektashi rnaster (murshid), for instance, or 
a priest or sacrificer, they act as representatives of the sectùar 
congregation and place themselves on a higher plane than the 
latter but in a position of inferiority with respect to the deity. 
However, the mediational structure may also be of another type, 
and daim to be the negation of hierarchy of any sort. In this 
modet the initiative must be entirely in the hands of the divin-
ity, which may manifest itself in a number of hierarchized 
emanations but without any mediation, by dispensing the gifts 
of its grace on the faith.ful, with believers receiving direct, im-
mediate inspiration. Charisma, divine grace, and spiritual 
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knowledge touch them without the help of any intermediary, 
and is in no way affected by the more or less effectiveness of 
any ritual or specifie expertise, performed or controlled by a 
mediating priest or rnaster. 
Following a struch1ral hypothesis suggested by Edmund 
Leach/0 1 have argued elsewhere that a crucial factor for un-
derstanding the communication between hurnans and God lies 
in the fact that the conceptualization of a hierarchical mode] 
of religions mediation corresponds to the dogma of orthodox 
faiths, while the conceptualization of a madel in which all hi-
erarchies are denied, in its real embodirnents, is closely linked 
to millenarian and mystical beliefs and to the development of 
heresies and heterodoxies,41 such as those related to Bektashism. 
The former madel may well support an established, luerarchi-
cal power, whereas the latter corresponds to an oppressed or 
deprived minority, seeking justification of its revoit against the 
established authorities. 
According to this madel, the establishment of a political hi-
erarchy within society goes hand-in-hand with the introjec-
tion of a tmified conception of divinity, that is, a pure mono-
theism within the theological system. On the other hand, a 
manifest hierarchical conception of the divinity goes along with 
egalitarian politics in human society. The conception of a rela-
tional equality, derived from the idea that people are equal in 
their relations with the divinity, is effectively present alongside 
an ideology of substantial egalitarianisrn among human beings. 
This brings us to the main assumption regarding the char-
acter of Bektashism. Insofar as the master is perceived as "God 
himself in a different guise", the system of beliefs and practices 
40 (Leach 1972) 
41 (Doja 2000a) 
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related to Bektashism \>VOuld be a liberation theology, which 
makes it possible to meet soctal, nùtural and national perspec-
tives. In lurn, when the master will be perccived as a kind of 
priest, "intermediary betv.•een a disciple and God", Bektashism 
would be an orthodox ideology aiming at the establishment of 
political hierarchy in society. 
At any case, it is through the elcct, thanks to the contacts 
and concretc ties created and mainlained with them through 
the mediation of spiritual knowledge (marifd), that seekers and 
follov.'ers formed and strengthened the bonds that attached 
them to the body of lheir religion, while at the same tlme they 
acquired mcrits and edified themselves. Howcver, for the mas-
ters of the Bektash1 Way, like in early Sufism, the mystical tcn-
dency becomes highJy dangerous as an individual expcriè.nce, 
since there can be mystic Ways, the Su fi argtunent goes, to other 
gods than God. Hcnce the necessity of guidance under an ex-
perienced director was insisted on. ln order togo through the 
Gateways of spiritual growth and lo experience the divine Re-
ality and ultimate Tntth (/111kiknt) and penctrate to their inner 
significance, one nceds a g1tide, a spiritual master (murshid)/1-
who had htmself alrcady reached the perfection stage of the 
'pcrfect huméUl being' (insn11-i knmi/), n and is thereby entitlcd 
to great veneration.4~ 
The normal relationship of a disciple to his or her master 
has often been described as a spiritual sonship, but the reJa-
tionship implied by these terms in different stages of develop-
ment came to be entirely different. On the accotmt of Bektashi 
begi.nn:ings in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and dur-
~2 (Birge 1937ll994]: 102-103) 
U(Birge 1937(199-l]: 96-97) 
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ing subsequent times of persecution, it is generaUy assumed 
that the continuai guidance of individual disciples has made 
the masters appear qui te naturally as the medium between God 
and humans. However, the overriding importance of the sys-
tem of master-disciple relationship, which became the very 
foundation of the Sufi orders, implies a shlft in morality. The 
inslltutionalization of the master--disciple hierarchy bronght 
forth the organization of what cannat be properly organized, 
Ulat is, persona} mysticallife and individual creative freedom, 
whtch are now fettered and subjected to conformity and col-
lecbve experience. I believe this process must correspond to 
the radical change that took place in Bektashi environ ment after 
the organization of the order in sixteenth cenntry, which may 
also be discemed each time after recovering from periods of 
persecution. In times of consolidation of the order, subjection 
lo lhe arbitrary will of the perfects tumed the follower into a 
spiritual slave, and not of God, but of a human being, albeit 
one of God's elect.~" 
For Bektashis, obedience must be total and tmquestionirtg, 
for failure to obey the master is a failure to keep the oath swom 
at initiation. lt is certainly not accidentai therefore that in the 
litera ture il is over and ovcr again repotted that one or another 
unworthy and unscrupulous master will be tempted to exploit 
his power for persona! advantage. Specialists may notice the 
fact, but they simplistically qualify that when such abuse oc-
curred it was condemned by the Bektashis themselves and out-
siders alike.~" This trend is considered as an occasional aberra-
tion from the generally assumed hurnanistic characteristics of 
Bektashism, much the same as individual corruption is often 
•~(Doja 2003) 
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assumed to have destroyed the 'progressive' role of one or an-
ether Bektashi convent, which on occasion tumed into a hot-
bed of conspiracy.47 
Religious scholars normally outline three successive stages 
of development in Sufism, going asceticism (zuhd) to mysticism 
(tasavvuf) and then to corporatism (tariknt) . Trimingham char-
acterized these three stages, respectively, as the individual's 
surrendering to God, their surrendering to a mle, and finally 
their su.rrendering to a person.-18 In the first stage, the master 
and his cirde of pnpils were frequently itinerant, having mini-
mum regulations for living a common life, leading to the for-
mation of undifferentiated, unspecialized lodges and convents. 
Methods of contemplation and exercises for the inducement of 
ecstasy were individualistic and comm1.mal. In the second stage, 
the transmission of a doctrine, a nùe and method corresponded 
to new types of collectivistic methods for inducing ecstasy. 
Deriving from professed illu.minates, the development of con-
tinuative teaching schools of mysticism (silsiln-tariknt) disci-
plined the mystical spirit within organized Su.f:ism and made it 
conform to the standards of tradition and legalism. In the third 
stage, the introduction and transmission of allegiance toward 
the doctrine and the rule formed new fo1.mdations for numer-
ous 'corporations' or 'orders', whose practices were fully in-
corporated with the saint veneration cult. 
Essentially, as in early Sufism, a change took place with the 
development of collegium pietaHs into a collegium initiati whose 
members ascribed thernselves to their initiator and his spiritua1 
ancestry, and were prepared to follow his Way and transmit it 
to future generations. The leading master even ceased to teach 
47(Shankland 2003) 
o18 (Trimlngham 1971 {1998]: 102-104) 
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directly, and delegatcd authority beth to teach and initiate to 
representatives (lw/ife). A special cult therefore surrounded the 
master, associated with the power thought to emanate from 
the saint founder of the order. He became the spiritua1 heir of 
the founder, whose qualities and powers become inherent in 
him upon his succession. The Bektashi life of recollection and 
meditation now became increasingly associated with aline of 
ascription, which bestowed the order, its formulae and sym-
bols, as emanating from the master and gtùding ail disciples 
along his Way in his name, whilc the new aura emanated from 
the master as a protégé (wali) of God probably came to imply 
the belief in his rolc as a mediator and as an intercessory with 
God. 
The theological rationalization of the necessary relationship 
between master and disciple was articulated through the his-
torical aspect of the divine hierarchical chain (silsiln), an idea 
which was available already in the very theological concep-
tions of Sufism. On first sight, as Trix showed, divine and his-
torical chains connecting the master to God may be seen as a 
deviee to Jegitimizc the place of the master cosmologically:19 
Yet, given the excessive proliferation of Orders and their rami-
fications in almost <my local setting,~0 there is good reason to 
believe that the primary concern of the founders and leaders 
of an order's branch, while seeking to gain persona! ascendancy 
and protect themselYes against accusations of doctrinal irregu-
larities,51 was that of demonstrating their orthodoxy by show-
ing how their teachings followed lhose of sorne famous Uleolo-
gian whose ortl1odoxy \·vas acknowledged by all. They could 
~q (Tri" 1993: 103) 
50As il can bt! .::hown in Albanian conlexl (Halimi 2000: 76) 
"'As for mslance in the c.ase of the Sanu.;1 (Evans-Pritchard 1949: 3) 
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then use the authority of this master and all intermediary and 
transmissive links right back to the Caliphs and the Imams for 
theil· teaching and practice. Thus, the silsila becarne a means to 
assert the new doctrinal orthodoxy of the order. As new ideas 
were fostered on eminent Sufis of the past in order to make 
these ideas respectable, the silsila provided a doctrinal as well 
as a power Iine leading to the ultimate source of religion. 
This process became clearly visible in the history of 
Bektashism with the ad vent of Balim Sultan at the headship of 
the Order in the early sixteenth century. Out of diverse heri-
tages and heterodox tendencies, the nebtùous group of Bektashi 
dervishes gradually developed into an ecclesiastic institution 
with a hlghly organized and centralized hlerarchy. All avail-
able accounts in the literature clearly show that this process 
was fostered under the specifie conditions of Ottoman patron-
age during the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, especially 
after the order became linked to the powerful military body of 
the Janissaries.52 A similar process was once again reiterated 
in Independent Albania in twentieth century when Bektashism 
enjoyed official state recognition. 
In these times the organizationalsystem of the Bektashi Order 
was increasingly replaced by another one, more sophisticated 
and much more institutional, ecclesiastical and hierarchical. 
Of course, even in the heydays of Bektashism, the distinction 
between masters and disciples was maintained, but the subor-
dination of the former to the latter was emphasized. In addi-
tion, both categories simply became the last two ranks of a larger 
hierarchy containing a number of other additional grades, so 
that the system of two classes was replaced by a much more 
complex one. The hierarchically lower level, the class of ordi-
52(0oja 2006) 
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nary people and potentiaJ followers was categorized as adepts 
(muhibs). The immediate! y superlor class included the eJect (eren 
or të mbërrimët), righteous and truJy initiated. They may be-
come dervishes and later 'fa thers' (lmbn), religious leaders hier-
archically recognized. They must be officially ordained by the 
'grandfathers' (dedt• or g}ysh) to whorn they pay allegiance. The 
organization as a whole was now headed by a single leader, 
the Arch-grandfather lr;;rnnd-dedt• or kn;egjyslt), who is sup-
ported by the 1eading figmes of 'grandfathers' known as his 
cali phs (lin/ ift>). 
Even though in cont1·ast •.,vith lhe uJema there were no class 
distinctions arnong dervish groups, Bektashi leaders formed an 
instituted religious class. The officiais of the arder approached 
the role of a clergy class similar to that in Sunni Islam or Ira-
nian Shiism, and the Bcktashi institutions provided a parochi<ü 
village religion, with a system of hierarchically affiliated lodges 
in AnatoJia and the Balkans, which in many respects was 
equivalent to the diocesan church system. Centralization was 
pushed to the extreme, as the Arch-grandfather, legitimate heir 
and terreslrial representative of Gad, came to act as the su-
prerne pontiff of the holy religion of the Order. High priest and 
master of the masters, Grandfather of ali Fathers and Grand-
fathers, he embodied ail of the spiritual power and was sup-
posed to lead and govem his followers by ensuring that the 
dogmas were rnaintained and transmitted properly, discipline 
and h·adition were respected, and orthodoxy was upheld. 
In this way, the Bektashi order developed its final forrns of 
organization and spilritual practices. Innovations were fuUy 
integrated and their spirit and airns were stereotyped. No fttr-
ther development was possible and new revelations of mysti-
cal insight that couJd mark a new point of departure in either 
doctrine or practice were precluded. The authoritarian prin-
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ciple had become the chief feature of the organization, along 
with the veneration of the master, the supreme inheritor of the 
divine mystical wisdom, and subjection to his authority was 
unconditioned. The organization was hierarchical, imposing 
uniformity, and instih1ting an elaborate initiation ceremony, 
non-hereditary offices and disciplinary practices, such as celi-
bacy and other austerities for adepts. 
Thus, the development of Bektashism appears to be a per-
fect illustration of the differents phases that all religions expe-
rience in their evolution, which corresponds to what Joachim 
Wach has called the threefold expression of the experience of 
the sacred.53 First of all, doctrinal elaboration, based on 
prophetism, gradually fashions revelation into an oral message, 
which receives a written codification, becoming a theology and 
a dogma. Next, the worship shapes behaviour into a liturgy, 
rites, a protocol, whose performance is usually entrusted to 
ministers of the cult who become its guardians and make sure 
the rules are not overstepped. Last, in reaction to the anarchist 
tendencies of frenetic movements or ataraxy, organizational 
measures are taken by the creation of a hierarchy determining 
roles, classing believers, and controlling the tradition. Its task 
is to coordinate and subordinate, canonize and censure, bal-
ancing the measures of tradition and innovation, and presid-
ing over the relations between the religious body and its envi-
ronment. At this point, a religious institution - the "Church"-
is established. It takes its place within a religious society by 
means of which human society asserts bath its convictions and 
its doubts. 
With these necessary changes, Bektashi religion, rather than 
seen as an individual life pa th, must be regarded as the collee-
~ (Wach 1958) 
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tive subservience to a road, as a religions order headed by au-
thoritarian leadership. Bektashism, henceforth viewed as a re-
vealed religion whose doctrines are literally true, bccomes a 
system of thought which also daims legal authority. The dif-
ferent elements on wnich this power is based consist of accep-
tance of the inherent superiority of the Bektashi leaders, the 
ratification of their decisions at collective ritttals, and the in-
culcation of a sense of appropriate behaviour encapsulated 
within a necessary moral philosophy. The programme as a 
whole is supportcd more immediatcly through a rich corpus of 
ritual, narrative, poetry, music, and myth. 
A different path is being taken by Alevi revival in contem-
porary Turkey, which can be argued here as a counter-example. 
TradilionaJ Alevism was based in closed rural communitics and 
consisted of local, largely orally transrnitted traditions, while 
the new Alevism is based in modem urban associations and is 
experien.cing a rapid process of rationalization and 
scriptmalization. This allowed a redistribution of the knowl-
edge capital to the extent of witnessing the appearance of a 
new body of exegetes, comparable to a clergy, that is, to use 
Weberian terms, a group holding the monopoly on the ma-
nipulation of the visions of the world. Indeed, knowledge is 
not only a symbolic capital but represents a prime essential 
resource, absolutely sacralized by aLI identity and polical ac-
tors of Alevism. However, in the course of movement no con-
sensus emerged among actors and enlTepreneurs who are even 
aware of their dissension on the origin and the very nature of 
Alevism. Ii aU are in search of a relevant knowledge, the ac-
counts are so contradictory that they often do not know which 
to believe. There are so many competing conceptions of what 
Alevism is or should be that the validity of knowledge canal-
ways be called in question. lnstead of leading to the unifica-
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tion of the movement, the knowledge contributes thereby to 
the dispersitOn of interpretations and the multiplication of con-
flicts. 
The persistence of debates and the not-attribution of a fixed 
meaning of Alevism cannot so much be explai.ned by its syn-
cretistic character, but rather because the knowledge is not yet 
nahualized and objectified. It can be argued that this state of 
affaù·s is due above ali to the fact that during the movement no 
major actor has yet emerged, likely to impose a single interpre-
tation of Al1evism in politically relevant categories. This is due 
to both the configuration of actors and the absence of institu-
tions making it possible to objectify a source of knowledge ac-
ceptable and accepted by ali. Finally, while seeking to orga-
nize themse-lves for their own protection an~ survival by build-
ing up a reliigious-cultural association, in the process the Alevis 
have not yet established a hierarchy of their own, claiming a 
'true' faith with its ow.n infallible dogmas and doctrines. 
One of the comerstones of political anthropology is that ide-
ology supports the existing power relations within the social 
community. Indeed, religious leaders are validated in many 
ways both by the overall Bektashi cosrnology and by the myths 
which Bekt.ashi masters themselves teach. Yet, both sociologi-
cal conceptions of the role of religions faith, orthodoxy and 
liberation, are not, by any rneans, mutually exclusive or essen-
tially contradictory. There are not two kinds of behaviour set 
once and forever, nor is there a merely "routinization" in a 
Weberian S·ense,54 but rather a process of dialectic change and 
transformation. As political conditions change and the organi-
zation of religions shuctures undergo a number of transfor-
mations, the final assumption is that the essential differences 
54(Weber 1978 [1922]: 246-254) 
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between hierarchical and unified types of theology, acting as 
media ting ctùtural systems of representation between humans 
and God, must change and adapt accordingly. 
If the character of Bektashism and ali Sufi groupings of Is-
lam showed first a cultural system corresponding to the model 
of religious mediation in which all hierarchies were denied, 
when the members of the previously persecuted religious mi-
nority did already acquire a degree of religious and political 
respectability within society at large, the subjective and 
millenarian doctrines ofheterodoxy and liberation theology fade 
into the background. ln the end, the chances are that the heirs 
of mystics and the heterodox promoters of spiritual reform and 
social movement will turn into followers and faithfu1 defend-
·ers of a legitima te authority. They will become the spokespeople 
for an institutionalized orthodoxy whose support will be sought 
by the political regime. 
The transition from innovation to conservatism in theologi-
cal conceptions and organizational structures, and the subse-
quent renewal of innovation, in support of either liberating 
social and national movements or the re-establishment of a new 
political power in society, takes on different forms and tones, 
forming a complex process requiring detailed historical and 
political analysis of the cultural values and social entities in-
volved. Instrumental transformations of this kind are clearly 
evidenced by the development of Bektashism down its history, 
depending on different political contexts and the course of 
events, as I showed in the classic Ottoman period, in the re-
formed Ottoman system or in Modern Turkey. 55 Less known 
are perhaps the transformations amongst the Bektashis in Al-
barna from independent to post-communist times. 
55 (Doja 2006) 
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INSTRUMENTAL POLIT! CS 
The origin of the Bektashis in Albania remains stiJl obscure. 
Reliable evidence indicates that their emergence cannet be dated 
earlier than the turn of seventeenth century,56 which is also 
consistent with the rather late lslamicization of the Albanian 
population. Man y pai.rlstaking efforts and fanciful daims, how-
ever, rnostly grounded in legend and hagiography, have tried 
to push back their origin in Albania, thus backing Bektashi 
daims of their presence even far before the appearance of the 
Ottomans in Balkans Y' It is likely that the Bektashis were present 
in Kruja, central Albania, in the Jast decades of sixteenth cen-
tury. However, if they were not exclusively rclated to the sol-
ders of the local Ottoman garrison, it is unlikely they might 
have had any significant impact on a local population not yet 
Islamicized or at least with an "Islam only feebly represented 
at this early date".58 
At any case, besides Sunni Islam, mystical forms of Islam 
spread in the country, and many of them must have been ad-
herents of the order of Bektashis. Particularly in the special 
conditions of repression after 1826, if the Janissary army and 
the Bektashi Order were to be formally abolished, lhe abolition 
!lo(Kissling 1962; StadtmüUer 1971) 
57(Clayer L990, 2002) 
91(Kiel 1995) 
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cotù.d only be effective in lstanbtù and the provinces where the 
central Ottoman administration had a direct authority and 
power. As the Albanians remained outside of these territories 
and the Ottoman authority was insignificant in the Albanian 
area during this period, the Bektashi continued to live undis-
turbed in Albania/ in a far better and more secure position than 
their fellows in Turkey. 
Another reason may be the fact that in Albania, in severa! 
instances religion has played a unique role compared to the 
rest of Europe. Not only was Albania, like Bosnia, one of the 
only European states with a majority converted to Islam, but 
Albania is also known as the only country worldwide where 
atheism was declared a comptùsory state doctrine in 1967. Still, 
the resulting prosecution of all religious congregations and the 
oppression of religious activities is not the only remarkable fact 
about religious life in Albania. 
Generally, in Southeast Europe and elsewhere ethn.icity is 
closeiy linked to the adherence to a specifie religion. Unlike 
any other nations in Southeast Europe1 Albanians tradition-
ally did not adhere to a single faith. Among Albanians, as an 
exception from the ntle, four different confessions prevailed: 
Catholicismmostly in the north, Orthodoxy mostly in the south, 
Swuù Islam rnostly in the central and eastern parts of the Al-
banian inhabited areas, and Bektashisrn mostly in the south. 
Such a situation must go thereby somehow toward contesting 
the fixed adherence to one specifie type of religion. Due to mis-
sionary efforts by Western and Middle Eastern congregations 
alike, even nowadays loyalty to one specifie religion in Alba-
niais fluid and might be divided.lt is, for example, not uncom-
mon that a contemporary Albanian might declare him- or her-
self to be a 'Protestant Muslim' if he or she has converted to 
one of the several Protestant congregations being engaged in 
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missionary work in the country. 
Islam did not seem to be very deeply rooted in Albania until 
the nineteenth cenhrry and it is usually assumed that this was 
also the case with Christianity sorne centuries earlier, which ot 
course must have facilitated conversion to Islam. In addition, 
there is general agreement about the fact that religion in Alba-
nia tends to be syncretistic. Many traits of Christianity survived 
among Muslim converts in form of the so called Crypto-Chris-
tianity. 1t is little surprising that a typical feature of the 'reli-
gious landscape' in Albania seems to have been the people 
called laramanë, literally 'spotted' or 'coloured', referring to the 
fact that many Albanians adhered to more than one confes-
sion at the same time.59 In relation to this somewhat divertive 
and flwd character of religions, Albanians are often depicted 
as showing rernarkable superficial religious feelings. Not only 
people's faith changed according to political opportunism, but 
religious services tumed into recreational events for small talk 
and gossip rather than serious worship. 
Albanians have never strictly adhered to many religions 
duties and practices. Prohibition of alcohol was never observed 
by Albanian Muslims, daily prayer (11amaz) was ignored and 
ritual fas ting (ramadan) hardly observed. Of course, they kept 
·the Koran in their house, helped the poor, performed the ritu-
als for the dead, and went on pilgrimage to visit the tombs of 
Muslirn holy men. Th.ere are numerous accotmts of Christians 
and Muslims visiting the sacred sites of each ethers' congrega-
tion. If we judge by the ex voto on the walls of shrines, a Chris-
tian custorn also adopted by Muslims, miracles are deeply be-
lieved. Not only are these practices still observed today, but 
59 (Skendi 1967 [1980]; Malcolm 2001) 
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sorne religious celebrations are becoming festive occasions for 
each Albanian family. No Muslim tamil y would miss the bnjram 
meal or fail to sacrifice a lamb, which is very similar to the way 
people celebrate Christmas in the West and in Albania ali.ke. 
People in modem-day Albania attend religious ceremonies re-
gardless of which faith they belong to, as a form of social gath-
ering. However, it cannot srmplistically be assumed that a corn-
mon religious substrantm exists for aU four religions in Alba-
nia, something promoted by local and western scholars alike, 
and that a typical Albanian form of religiosity developed. 
Religious conversion and politicsJ as I showed elsewhere/"> 
normally related to a collective history, which embraced social 
and cultural comrnunities, or more precise! y, members of a fam-
ily, a lineage, a village or a larger group. An individual con-
verts to Islam or to Christianity because he or she belongs to a 
social network. Conversion and religious belonging or affilia-
tion~ are therefore part of a process of socialization through 
the purstùt of a collective identity. Collective representations 
and beliefs, ritual practices and ceremonies are considered part 
of the official religion - Christianity or Islam accordingly - of a 
given local community or social network, regardless of whether 
a particular cultural trait does or does not form part of the 
world religion in question. They are categorized collectively 
not as religious traits of an established world system but as 'an 
ancestrallegacy of traditions and customs'. Belonging to a reli-
gion means beJonging to a social group. 
In the case of religious differences, a shift exists between the 
actual social organization and the discourses that th.e actors 
thernselves may have on society and social behaviours. This 
shift may be considerable, insofar as at the leve1 of local corn-
"'(Doja 2000b) 
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munity there is no question of official associations, in the 
Weberian sense of groups formed in order to achieve certain 
objectives,61 but rather of informai commtmities, which rest on 
the simple feeling that people being part of them consciousJy 
share a common religious affiliation. Their content and their 
botmdaries can vary according to the point of view retained. 
Thus, listening to the discourses of most Christians and Mus-
lims, one can have sometimes the impression of a total rupture 
between them. On the other hand, empirical observations at 
the level of any local community reveal between Christians and 
Muslims not only a perfect inclusive community of language, 
of course, but also a very bread inclusive community of modes 
of existence and of cultural behaviours. 
Although the individual may share group prejudices to-
wards ether religious groups, the essential group values are 
defined by a system of kinship and alliance, of solidarity and 
hostility, of status and social position, which I considered else-
where as being cornmon to ali Albanians.62 Being Muslirn or 
Christian is based on the particular farnilyi kinship, territorial, 
or social group, which by tradition relates to religious 'belong-
ing' or adherence. It is not based on a specifie belief system, 
religious conviction or rihtal practice. Rather, it is grounded in 
the social culture. Religion is a conformity, which is transmit-
ted throughout the community. 
61 (Weber 1978 [1921)) 
112 (Doja 1999a) 
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NA TIONALIST PROJECTS AND 
INTELLECTUAL SPECULATIONS 
Bektashi institutions were mostly situated outside of the 
Albanian towns, which made it possible for the order to main-
tain its mral character with most of Albanian dervishes hav-
ing their roots in the local peasantry. It can be said, however, 
that in Albania Bektashism arnved at its highpoint in striking 
similarity with its Ottoman and Modem Turkish heydays. Al-
ready during Ottoman period, Bektashis in Albania and in 
southem parts of former Yugoslavia benefited from political 
hegemony and many Christian sanctuaries feU into their hands. 
The growth of Bektashism in Albarua seems to have profited 
especially under the political patronage of Ali Pasha of 
Tepelena, the powerful quasi-independent governor of 
Yoannina from 1788 to 1822, who had entered into dispute 
with Ottoman central authority in order to gain recognition 
for an autonomous administrative entity. 
Following the exarnple set by his contemporary and fellow-
cmmtryman Mehrned-Ali Pasha in Egypt, Ali Pasha had gained 
considerable success in establishing and strengthening a local 
administration that had recognized his authority in Thessaly and 
in sou them and central Albania, where he ruled with a degree of 
complete independence. In this context, Bektashi leaders must have 
developed close links with the secessionist efforts of Ali Pasha, 
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and they actually benefited of new opportunities for the order to 
enlarge its following considerably, to such an extent as Ali Pasha 
is considered to be "responsible for the propagation of 
Bektashism", because of the support he gave toits propagandists.63 
The emphasis on the relationship between the Bektashis and 
Ali Pasha is clearly related to political considerations. Ali Pa-
sha embraced and supported Bektashism because of its grow-
ing ideological and organisational potential in being instrumen-
tal for backing his own general po licy. Bektashi dervishes are 
said to have served hlm as diplomatie agents, and he used their 
organization and religious doctrine to win poptùar support and 
occupy new territories, to increase his power, widen his poli ti-
cal influence, and consolidate his independence from the cen-
tral Ottoman authorities. By embracing Bektashism and giving 
his support to the spread of the order which called for Shiite 
revenge against Sunni powers, he was able to engage in a con-
flict, both political and religions, against Ottoman dominance. 
Modem area specialists, however, notice but do not explain 
the facts, while others, who suddenly seem to be interested in 
analytical approach, undoubtedly imbued with the general 
development of a theoretical and ideological interest in nation-
alism which has put instrumental ethnicity far in the forefront, 
may go on asto quite rnisunderstand the politics of religion. A 
case in point is Nathalie Clayer with her "myth of Ali Pasha 
and the Bektashis" where she tends to deny the historical evi-
dence and daims that the political-religious connection of Ali 
Pasha and the Bektashis is only a myth created much more 
lately and perpetuated in the enthusiastic intellechtal circles of 
Albanian Bektashi and nationalist leaders, relayed by the tra-
63 (Hasluck 1929 [Istanbul: Tsis, 2000]: 428-442) 
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dition of western scholarship.64 
Many n:tYlhs were clearly aimed at forming an Albanian 
national identity associated to the Bektashi religious identity 
according to Bektashi politics. Yet, what is lacking here is a 
further analytical imagination to see that such myths and the 
ideology they con vey do not contradict by any means the his-
torical evidence of real politics. The point is certainly not that 
of other authors who naively daim that Bektashi allegiance 
could not ma ke the ruthless Ali Pas ha an exemplar of the 
order's purported virtues.h' On the contrary, as it once hap-
pened at the time of fust Ottomans in fifteenth century, again 
with Ali Pasha in Albania at the tum of nineteenth century, 
real politics and ideological myths seem both to be transforma-
tions of the same instrumental pattern of religious politics. 
Ali Pasha is indeed said to have spread the Bektashi "her-
esy" among the Albanian Muslims with the aim of dividing 
Albanians from Turks and creating the first national Albanian 
state. Clearly, Bektashism is never boldly claimed as the poten-
tial power to crea te an independent "Albanian identity" and 
an independent "Albanian State", but the impact of a figure 
like Ali Pasha is due to the fact that he could more concretely 
embody a "local resistance against central authority" through 
his polity and the large autonomy which he managed to ac-
quire. The historically grounded position of the Bektashis in 
contesting the central Sunni authorities, as a religious group 
professing a heterodox Islam, naturally opposed them to the 
Sunni-based policy of the Ottoman authority. Subsequently, it 
seemed nahtral to transform this religious opposition into a 
MJn: (ln: Schwandner-Sievers & Fischer 2002: 127-133) Reprint in her own 
collection: lReprint in her own collectiOn: Clayer 2002: 151-158) 
oS(Norton 2001 : 190) 
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culhtral-religious opposition and later to a political-religious 
opposition. 
Indeed, after the defeat of Ali Pasha in 1822, followed a few 
years later in 1826 by the persecution of the Bektashi order in 
the whole Ottoman Empire, a ruthless purge of the Bektashis 
was undertaken, in Albania as elsewhere, which might have 
compelled them to find themselves in opposition. Henceforth, 
they will embark on a prolonged resistance to Ottoman power. 
Later again, during the diificult history of assertion of the Al-
banian national identity in the late nineteenth century, a great 
number of Albanian Muslirns, despite their "divided loyalty",66 
often firmly expressed the will to sever links w ith the Ottoman 
Empire.67 
In this context, the political position of the Bektashis is par-
ticularly revealing. In discourses related to religious revival, be 
it confratemal or otherwise, one recurrently finds nationalist 
motives, w hich better illustra te the necessity of considering su ch 
a powerful mobilizing force in the role that religious leaders 
daim they play in this field. 
The Bektashi's traditionally difficult relationships with the 
religious and political Ottoman authorities certainly contrib-
uted to their choice of anti-Turk and nationalist stance,68 but 
this went along with a reinforcement of liberation heterodoxy 
characteristic of their system of beliefs and practices. It is cer-
tainlynot surprising that itwas NaimFrashëri- the well-known 
Albanian poet and activist of national movement in the nine-
teenth century, who was striving to establish a unified written 
Albanian language and glorify the Albanian past in a litera-
66 (Skendi 1967: 469-470) 
67 (Bartl 1968) 
68 {Morozzo della Rocca 1 990) 
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ture of his own- that explained and to sorne extent founded, 
in his Bektashi Pages {1896),69 the novel theological and practi-
cal principles of Bektashisrn and the organizational rules gov-
erning its functioning . 
The matter is especially interesting fm its en tire freedom from 
any fanaticism, dogrnatism and mystification, and its insistence 
on ethics.7° Under the direct influence of Naim Frashëri's intel-
lectual speculations, the development of Albanian Bektashism 
showed, much more than any other Sufi order or other 
Bektashis elsewhere, that esoteric knowledge was not a privi-
lege exclusive to a particular genealog;icallineage but acquired 
by spiritual progression, thanks to a divine grace freely and 
directly bestowed, in close relationshi.p with the expression of 
Albanian national sentiments and the inculcation of patrio-
tism as the highest of virtues. 
In the context of Bektashism and Shiite Islam, a fmmding 
value is attributed to the drama of Karbala, where the Imam 
Hussein, son of Ali and grandson of Muhammad, was killed in 
nd 680. Bektashis, like ali Shiite Muslims {Ayoub 1978), put great 
emphasis on keeping alive the memory of this tragic event 
through epie poetry, plays, processions, commemorative ser-
vices and other mnemonic deviees. The rituals of commemora-
tion of Hussein's martyrdom, the use of very direct language 
and imagery, the re-enactment of sulffering, and the constant 
repetition of ideas serve as a basis for identity and cohesion of 
the community (Norris 1993: 171-174). 
Naim Frashëri also retells the saga of Shiisrn in a monumen-
tal, long epie poem in. twenty-five cantos entitled Qerbelrzja (first 
published in 1898). By relating to this seemingly religious but 
~~'~ Uokl1926) 
10 (Xholi 1998) 
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political confrontation, Naim Frashëri, following a long-stand-
ing tradition of Eastern litera ture and philosophy, tried to realise 
and promote his enlightened and humanist liberating ideas. 
He praised the justice of the Imam as the standard-bearer and 
champion of liberation against the injustice of the tyrant and 
usurper adversaries, while declaring as an inexorable principle 
the conclusion that in the battle between justice and injustice, 
liberation and tyranny, the final outcome shows justice and 
liberation victorious. More than a retelling of historical events, 
Q('rbelnjn is a moralistic and intellectual record, it is a reformu-
lation and promtùgation of humanist rnorality and principles, 
an appeal for moral purity and perfection, for human.kind to 
be able to enjoy earthly life and confront its reversai (cf. Xholi 
1998). 
Nevertheless, in actualizing the events, the fornuùation of 
these notions and the goal of these visions have to be consid-
ered with what all Naim Frashëri's poetic and moral specula-
tions normally lead: the Battle of Karbala is thought of as the 
Albanian fight against Ottoman power and that, in their battle, 
the Albanians wotùd win since justice was on their side. In the 
last canto of his opus, Frashëri suddenly forget the drama of 
Karbala and keeps talking about Albanian national issues only, 
propagation of language,leaming and education, need of union, 
gentleness and fraternity for Albanians. You even may sense 
that aJl twenty-four previous cantos are only written for bring-
ing about in the last one: the Albanians and the Albanian ques-
tion. For Frashëri, the meaning of the battle becomes as much 
human salvation as national liberation. 
Actually, his Bektashi epie has to be judged in the context of 
another monumental epie, the History of Skanderbeg, in which 
Frashëri narrates the exploits, successes and failures of the Al-
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banian national hero against the Ottoman invaders. This work 
is held to be his most famous and greatest poetic aspiration, a 
supreme attempt by the poet to project his idealism, patriotism 
and sense of Albanian ctùh.tral continuity back into a past age 
when for twenty-four years the Albanians had fought under 
the Skanderbeg's leadership to defend their liberty. Even though 
both Qerbelajn and the History of Skanderbeg were published 
the same year and were written on the same style, the former 
grmmded on Muslim mythology and Eastern mysticism, the 
latter on Classic mythology and Christian symbolism, it is only 
the latter epie that became the poem of Albanian national pride. 
The martyrs of Karbala, quite contrary to historical evidence 
and Eastern tradition, owe much to the heroism of the roman-
tic era, including Frashëri's own poetic portray of Skanderbeg 
(Norris 1993:182). 
Naim Frashëri was one of the most eminent thinkers and 
leading figme of Albanian Bektashism, Albanian romanticism 
and the Albanian national movement. In the formulation and 
argumentation of nationalist ideology, Frashëri made use of 
bath religious and realist, pantheist and gnostic conceptions, 
coming from bothEasternand Western traditions. Amongother 
things, he openly suggested and theorized the reconciliation of 
religion with the idea of the nation. 
Yet, even though in his oeuvre and inspiration an impor-
tant place is taken by religion, its dogma, terminology, and 
conceptual deviees, even though he continually addressed to 
God as the divine, supernatural power in explaining every-
thing related to human being and life, Frashëri's rationale was 
ofhumanist and nationalistinterest. In his worldview, religions 
conceptions have not a special role independent of his ratio-
nalist, humanist and nationalist ideology. He writes very often 
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about and takes any opportunity of mentioning God, but very 
freely and even giving the divine a role in the liberating move-
rnent and national education of Albanians. The martyrs of 
Karbala, quite contrary to historical evidence and Eastern h·a-
dition, owe much to the heroism of the romantic era, includlng 
Frashëri's own poetic portray of Skanderbeg (Norris 1993: 182). 
While in Qerbelaja, events and characters gain moral verisimili-
tude in the way that beliefs of good and evil are transmitted by 
Shiite and Bektashi oral tradition, by their means Frashëri give 
shape to the system of values which constitute the core of all 
his poetic and intellectual oeuvre. Cloaking the discourse in 
religious dress Frashëri aimed to promote his nationalist ideas, 
and elements of the divine wcre not necessarily religious con-
victions but very often used as metaphors of worldly and na-
tional values, merely religions wordings but easily acceptable 
to the masses. 
Sorne specialists in the area, probably lirnited by the narrow 
contours of the very object of their studies, hastily and 
uncritically presents the construction of the Albanian nation 
as an offspring emanating exclusively from Bektashism. It is 
not the case here to redeploy the history and a-religious char-
acter of Albanian nationalism (Doja 1999b; 1999c; 2000c) nor 
the poli tics of religions and religious shifting in the reconstruc-
tion of identities in muJti-religious Albania (Doja 2000b), but 
this view is definitely an exaggeration, and frankly aberrant. 
When Nathalie Clayer (2002: 135), for instance, wenders in a 
"naturally legitimate" way why particular links existed be-
tween Bektashism and Albanian nationalism,- more exactly, 
"why this brotherhood offered nationalists a privilegcd frame-
work in the Albanian society of the tirne" and "why there were 
no ether stntctures able to help the néltionalist movement", -
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this is a dear statement that could not stem from someone hav-
ing even a minimal knowledge of the Albanian situation. lt 
seems that specialists in the area are apparently more worried 
to justiiy a somewhat essential relationship to their own sup-
posed distinct abject of study rather than to understand what 
a religious movement cotùd be and how it could be analyzed 
and explained in sociological or any tenns. Ali of this, in spite 
of a particularly energetic zeal in accumuJating masses of docu-
mentary information on Musl.im brotherhoods in Albania 
(Clayer 1990) or throughout Southeast Europe (Clayer 1994). 
Simjlarly, I believe it is an exaggeration to argue, as Duijzings 
(2000: 167) does, that Naim Frashëri's attempt has been to 
bridge the religious divide of Albanians by proposmg to tum 
Bektashism into an all-encompassing national religion for aU 
Albanians.71 Earlier accounts in the literature have suggested 
that Naim Frashëri's attempts were aimed simply at giving the 
Bektashis a somehow Albanian character,n but this view seems 
to stem from an uncritica1 reliance on eclectic compilations of 
literary histories (Elsie 1995; e.g. Mann 1955) found through-
out Duijzings's book. 
As a matter of fact, this belief seems simply impossible and 
even quite absurd to those with a minimal knowledge of Alba-
nian context. The Bektashis, in spite of their concentration in 
Albania, were a small minority quite marginalized within Al-
banian society, especially before the spread of national move-
ment. Naim Frashëri was certainly not blind to U1is fact. The 
relationship of religion and national ideas in Frashëri's con-
ceptions has been very often tmcritically investigated by schol-
ars camped on bath sides of either religious (Qazimi 1996} or 
-, (Duijzmgs 2000: 157-175) 
n (Stadtmüller 1971) 
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nationalist (Xholi 1998) !ines. There is reason to believe, how-
ever, that Naim Frashëri didn't intend so much to provide Al-
banians with a unique religion, but rather to make nationalist 
ideas successfully acceptable to Albanians of whatever religious 
affiliation. 
The problem, however, is not so much whether this has been, 
as Duijzings argues, a failed attempt to bridge the religious 
divide between Albanians by promoting a secular national 
cause th at incorpora tes sorne heterodox Bektashi elements 
within it. In the last two chapters of his book, Duijzings at-
tempted a comparative textual analysis of what he asserts are 
Albanian and Serbian examples of how religious symbolisms 
infiltrate "national" imaginations, arguing that Albanian na-
tionalists at one time might have attempted to infuse their cause 
with religious elements largely drawn from Bektashism. 
As I showed elsewhere in full details (Doja 2004b, 2005), 
taking Naim Frashëri's epie reproduction of the Battle of 
Karbala and situating it on comparative grounds with such a 
state and church-produced body of literature that recrea tes and 
embellishes the Kosovo Battle mythology in Serbia, as Dtùjzings 
(2000: 157-202) does, is in itself a problematic issue in method-
ological and analytical terms. Dwjzings finds both have rouch 
in common: each have been portrayed through epie song and 
folk verse, both record a lost battle in which righteous forces 
were overcome by evil ones, and the main hero was sacrificed, 
leading to the necessity for followers to accept suffering as a 
step to redemption and a revoit against tyranny. Overall, 
Duijzings believes both lent similar weight to the growth of 
Albanian and Serbian nationalisms respectively during the 
rùneteenth century. 
Still, as sorne of his n;viewers note, excepting the partly reli-
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gious nahue of both myths, they cannot be compared, either 
in terms of content or their elaboration and diffusion. Duijzings 
recognizes the lack of a deeply rooted cultural tradition for the 
failure of Naim Frashëri's epie to become a political symbol in 
Albanian nationalism. By contrast, what has made the Kosovo 
Battle myth so extremely powerful is its making rooted in 
folklorism and the church culture of Serbian nationalism. 
Ouijzings (2000: 176-202) has correctly understood_ it this way 
as suggested in his chapter on the Serbian folk-epie of Kosovo. 
The Serbian Kosovo myth and epie poetry grew out of a long 
elaboration of oral and chnrch traditions; their religions con-
tent was closely tied to the ctùhtre harboured by the Orthodox 
Church, a powerful institution always influential in Serbian 
nationalist ideology. Although the Kosovo myth was created 
in Serbia and never resonated in Kosovo itself, throughout the 
twentieth century it provided for Serbs a set of roles with which 
to sort out into proper categories ambigtwus or overlapping 
identities in Kosovo. 
Elements of Serbian nationalist discourse have been central 
in rituals of national regeneration throughout the life-time of 
former Yugoslavia, but they were present especially in Serbia 
during the 1980s. Aiter the downfall of communism and fed-
eralism in Yugoslavia, the Serbian Orthodox Church revital-
ized nationalism by organizing two sets of 'national' rituals: 
mass baptisms of Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo and dur-
ing 1988-1989 the 'procession' of the alleged remnants of Prince 
Lazar through Serb-poptùated villages and monasteries from 
Croatia and Bosnia to Kosovo where they were eventually re-
interred after a ftmeral ceremony of re-consecration. The relies 
of Lazar were paraded arotmd the province of Kosovo as a 
reminder of the killing of the Christ-Prince and as a territorial 
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daim. The retum of the 'heroic' prince to the place where the 
Serbs had been defeated by the Turks and where Lazar lost his 
ille was represented as the completion of a fulJ circle, as a 'new 
beginning' and 'rebirth' of the Serbian symbolic community, 
lhe 'heavenly kingdom' of Serbia. Both rituals functioned to 
reinstitute and preserve the symbolic order by means of a sym-
bolic confirmation of the will of Serbian nation to restore and 
redaim its 'dignity' and 'rights' that, according to Serb nation-
alists, had been undermined by successive conquerors of the 
area as weil as by former Yugoslavia (see Salecl1994). The mass 
baptisms of Serbs in Kosovo and the retum of Prince Lazar's 
relies to Kosovo constituted meaning-creating and nation-in-
stituting rituals. The former were effectively pilgrimages 
whereas the latter had an effect somewhat similar to those that 
Turner (1974) associates with pilgrimage. Unlike pilgrimages, 
however, in this case it was not travelling to, or coexistence at, 
a given sacred or administrative centre that constituted the 
main meaning-creating experience. lt was the route of the pro-
cession that demarcated the 'territories of the Serbian nation' 
and brought together Serbs from Serbia proper and those ar-
eas within different republics and provinces of former Yugo-
slavia. An important aspect of both types of ritual is their em-
phasis on 'cultural regeneration'. However, the centrality of 
Lazar's bones in the latter ritual affirms the cultural/spiritual 
as weil as physical/biological endurance of the national com-
munity, for in the Christian-Orthodox tradition relies of saintly 
figures have spiritual value. This coexistence of the material 
and the spiritual, ofbiological and cultural continuity, has been 
comrnon in Serbian nationalist discourse. Thus, relations be-
tv.reen church, state, and nationalism were enonnously strength-
ened. Even the military murderers were transformed into he-
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roes through epie songs, a process aptly labelled as 'gusle laun-
dering' (Duijzings 2000: 199), while Serb militiamen involved 
in the atrocities wore patches depicting the battle of Kosovo 
and received medals with the name of Milosh Obilic, the main 
hero of the Kosovo Battle.73 
The tendency to cquate Serbian and Albanian nationalisms 
is not orùy unjustified but is actually a dangerous ambush in 
which Serbian nationalist agitators are still trying to entrap 
public and scholar1y opinions. In fact, the political instntmen-
tality of the Serbian myths of the Battle of Kosovo is not exactly 
commensurable with Naim Frashëri's Qerbelnjn, but rather with 
other types of politiical folklorism and pseudo-culturalis t 
projects: serving either chauvinistically or ideologically charged 
nationalisms. Examples of this sort could be found, for instance, 
in the communist propaganda of Eastern and Central Europe 
when cultural and folkloric traditions have been instntmental 
for justifying and rnagnifying the 'authentic' foundations of 
71 ln lhts connection, it is the revival of historical memories thal creates and 
revives supposedly rïxed patterns of behaviour, not the other way a round, 
as 11 is sometimes supposed. For instance, the Serbian daim to be defend-
ing an ungrateful Christian Europe from a Muslim onslaught, although 
parallel to the Serbs' posruring m the nineteenth century, when the myth of 
Ko~ovo in !O<>mething like its present form was actually created, is linked 
to the contemporary nationalist revival and to the manipulation of the 
Kosovo myth speciflca!Jy. 
Until recently, Serbian historiography recorded that the battle had been a 
Serbian and Christian victory over Muslim Turks. Jt is only since 1968 that 
the construal of the battle as a great Serbian defeat has gained essentially 
unanimous assent among Serbs. Nevertheless, it might be ironical for the 
Serbian nationalist mythology thal Milosh Kopilic, the grand hero who 
challenged and ktl led the Ottoman Sultan in the Battle was, if not Al banian, 
certainly not a Serb, according to most realistic scholarship reviewed in 
Malcolm (1998: 58-80).Yet this puzzle should in!orm locaJ scholars more 
about the transformahonal quality of mythical thought than about histori-
cal facts used for nationalist ideologies. 
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the political and ideological regime, as I have shown elsewhere 
for the case of communist Albania (Doja 1998). Other anthro-
pologists have suggested a similar argument (e.g. Gossiaux 
1995) . . Another parallel with the Serbian Kosovo mythologie~ 
can be found in Hitler's propaganda campaign of 1930s and 
early 1940s when German Volkskunde traditions have been in-
strumental in promoting the sinisterly notorious Nazi ideel-
ogy. But to compare Frashêri's national ideology to Serbian 
nationalism, as Duijzings does, is like comparing Herder's ro-
manticism to Hitler's National Socialism! 
While the Battle of Kosovo was instrumental for Serbian 
nationalism as the mythologizing and embellishment of a lo-
cal, historical and factual reality, Naim Frashëri uses the drama 
of Karbala as a local and historical metaphor of a mythic and 
ethical worldview. In this sense, the relational parallel between 
Albanian and Serbian national ideology, if any, seems to be in 
difference instead of similarity. There are two different, op-
posed conceptualizations that give way, after instrumental 
transformations, to a number of single utterances, which share 
sorne similar details in style and content but are irrelevant for 
any relational comparison. When you compare such single ut-
terances then, you do not compare them on a superficial, lin-
ear one-to-one basis, but only with respect to their relative set-
ting in the whole field of constructed nationalisms, and their 
relative difference or similarity with all other relevant achlal 
occurrences within the same field. Both types of transforma-
tions are variants of the same pattern, but there are differences 
in the form and content of their conceptualization of prerequi-
sites and outcomes. 
What is lacking here is the analytical and anthropological 
insight to understand that the poetic and intellectual specula-
tions of Naim Frashëri, which retell the saga of Shüsm as the 
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religion ofvictims of persecution, are relevant because they have 
been instrumental in shaping theological ideas with gnostic and 
'dualist coiceptions. Even though specialists of the literature 
can argue that "Bektashi texts in general are relatively silent 
on points of social ethics" (De}ong 1989: 10), anth.ropologists, 
after Clifford Geertz (1973), know very well how from the idea 
of suffering dualist conceptions and liberating theologies de-
velop. This is explicitly articulated in Naim Frashëri's Qerbelaja 
• as similar Christian hierarchical symbols are in his History of 
Skanderbeg. The evil exists from the origins, having its own cos-
mological and anthropologiœl consistency of which no expia-
nation is attempted, but a strong; assertion is given without 
any margin of ambiguity: 
The good and the evil, Gad and the devil, the heaven and 
heU, and ali ether things that exist are not ether but human. So 
the ancient sages have said, ali have been clearly separated 
from the origin; you can take the part that you wish, you can 
choose either the Imam Hussein or Yezid and Muaviye; one 
get you the salvation, and the ether the perdition. (Qerbelaja 
XIII, 448-459, my translation) . 
In the drama of Karbala, the Îlnam endures a divinization 
process that fulfils, so to speak, a function of "encotuagement" 
of the liberation fight, of escape from the evil and the world in 
which it is inscribed. And this is because the mysterium 
iniquitatis that renders the world and the worldly ille "repug-
nant" (Qerbelaja XIV, 27) is tmassailably at the forefront. The 
power of God therefore endures an obvious lûnitation, justify-
ing a suspicion of either impotenoe or malice. Would it be pos-
sible and therefore necessary to interpret this "malicious God" 
as the second god of dualist print (Guidetti 1998)? In Bektashi 
conceptions the wcirld is clearly s~eparated into good and evil, 
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as humankind is divided into the oppressed and the oppres-
sors. Satan is held to be actually incamated, for Bektashis, in 
the person of Yezid, the enerny of Ali, and in his offspring. It ir:; 
not difficult therefore to assume a painful fight of liberation of 
the spirit from the worldly irnprisonment, which is exactly for 
what "strikes the heart of the gnosis" (Bianchi 1983: 15). 
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LIBERATIONIDEOLOGY AND 
ETHNICIZED RELIGION 
U is my contention therefore that it is this dualist character 
together with pantheist conceptions that might have reason-
ably made it possible for the Bektashi religion to join with Al-
banian national ideology. Indeed, it would be necessary to ar-
gue this link, especiaUy by the analysis of the organizational 
and theological character of Bektashism êlS a mystical, hetero-
dox arder throughout its historical transformations. Only to 
the extent of the artictùation of contest and liberation ideolo-
gies with the hierarchization of covenantal structures of di-
vine mediation, can we understand not only the special"failed" 
relation of Bektashi religion to Albanian nationalism through 
Naim Frashëri's' poem Qerbelnja, but also the difficulty in ex-
plaining why Alban:ilan nationalism generally lacked strong 
religious attachrnents. 
Already in earl y sixteenth century and probably in much the 
same vein, the ideological basis of the Iranian d ynasty exposed 
to the hostility of Ottoman power was rooted in the political 
promotion of mystic extremist Shiism and messianic Turkic be-
liefs drawn from those Kizilbash elements which wotùd subse-
quently become the essential constituent parts of Bektashism/4 
and to which Frashëri's speculations were grounded. 
7
• (Doja 2006) 
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In matters of theological doctrine, he even rejected the au-
thority of Koran, the sacred book of Islam. Pantheism in 
Bektashism is also acknowledged and even furthered by Nai.m 
Frashëri (see Shuteriqi 1982; Qosja 1986), although the appli-
cation of this term is anathema ta many Sufis. In a number of 
works, surpassing pantheist conceptions evolved in main-
stream Bektashism, he stressed in tmusual way that the book 
of Bektashis is their faith in the Universe, and especially in 
hurnan beings, since the true faith is written nowhere, not on 
any book either, but rather is in their heart. Furthermore, the 
absence of any fanaticisrn and dogmatism are characteristic 
features of Nai.m Frashëri's Bektashism (see Xholi 1998). 
Nai.m Frashëri's argument of the Universe as the lively rep-
resentation of God was another way of stating materialist and 
realist principles, in particular with his conception of an infi-
nite soul unified with nature and waiting for special condi-
tions to materialize itself into the infinite variety of things of 
the world (Sl1këndijë e diellit ndnj manushaqes). Frashëri brought 
about with his oeuvre a new conception of the divine, in sharp 
contrast with orthodox Koranic Islam and much more hereti-
cal than heterodox Bektashisrn. Even though relying in Bektashi 
conceptions that locate the letters of Revelation and the signs 
of Zodiac in Man (Birge 1937 [1994]: 282), his teaching does 
not cast Man, however, as a microcosm reflecting the macro-
cosm, but rather presents the cosmos as a projection of Man. 
For Nai.m Frashëri, the real believer shotùd know that Gad is 
not in the heavens, but inside the human he art: "I was looking 
everywhere ta find God, the great God of Truth; it was inside 
me, myself I had it inside" (Lulet e Verës). 
By taking Gad from heaven down to earth, the divine, in-
cluded and tmified in nature, has no power other than to ma-
terialize itself into the infinite variety of things of the world, 
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and hence to become available to knowing. God is not any more 
a secret power far away from the human world, but a power 
that shows itseli at any moment, and that human beings can 
see and know, approach and reach (Pnrajsn dhe Jjnlë fluturnke). 
God is identified with humans as weil as with that divinely 
created environment that manifests God's own nature. The 
ancient heritage of Islamic esoteric knowledge (al-batin) is forc-
ibly re-expressed in Frashëri's conviction that one may know 
the nature of divinity within one's own being, body, and espe-
cially beauty of visage. The features of human being are the 
mirror of divinity: "When God fust sought to show his face, he 
made mankind his dwelling place. One who knows one's in-
ward mind, knows that God is the mankind" (Njeriu). 
Everybody's human ille is therefore an individualization of 
the natttral infinite soul, while death is the individual part go-
ing back to its primary source - "Light going back to Light" 
(Qerbelaja VI, 65)- for it becomes a regeneration of naturallife. 
In Frashëri' s conception of immortality the re is rto he a vert artd 
heU, divine damnation and reward, but simply a worldly life 
with human being on its centre, where heaven and heU are ail 
together, always in permanent and uninterrupted renewing, 
transformation and regeneration (Lulet e Verës; Qerbelnjn XI). 
In an unusual development of heterodox Bektashi conceptions, 
for Frashëri, metempsychosis and life after death is neither 
promise of recompense nor threat of condemnation but it sim-
ply guaranties the transmission of human and national values 
from the past to the future. 
The distinct conceptions of the divine and its attributes ac-
cording to separate religions, emphasized by differing rituals 
and institutions, brought near divisions among Albanians. In 
contrast, Naim Frashëri claimed that true Muslims do not nec-
essarily need a mosque and that Arabie and Persian, the lan-
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guages of the Prophet or the Imams, though especially intended 
for religious practice, are not convenient for Albanians. "With 
pray and ritual you cannot find God, neither with Lent nor 
blessing, as do who don't know. And you priests and dervishes 
forget church and mosque, for church and mosque cannot be 
but where God really is" (Lu/et e Verës). His heretical teach.ings 
excluded any ritual or institution, aiming to the political inten-
tion of elimina ting ali dividing elements. God cannot be that of 
separate religions but that of pantheism, included and tmified 
as it is into Nature and Universe. 
In Naim Frashëri's poems, in particular, Sufi mysticism is 
blended with a nature pantheism centred on Albanian home-
land: the defiant peaks of the Albanian mountains express the 
will of people; they point upwards to the skies and ultimately 
to heaven and d.ivinity. Frashëri's pantheism was an original 
theological conception espedally elaborated with an exernplary 
conviction within the social conditions of Albanian national 
movement.75 In his verse the Albanian homeland became part 
of the divine scheme. Yet, his non-sectarian, interfaith, and 
national appeal is not only a persona! characteristic of his own 
and his fellow nationalists, but is also expressed in typically 
gnostic and heterodox terms (Norris 1993: 164-165). Ilis he-
retical and pantheist conceptions, close to the universal pan-
theism of Spinoza, the romanticisrn of Goethe and Schiller and 
75 ln his Bektashi Pages, he wrote: ''The Bektashis are brothers and one soul.. 
They love other Moslems and Chnsttans as their own sou!... But most of 
ali they love their Motherland and their fellow countrymen, for this is the 
best of ali things". According lo him, the role of Bektashi dignitaries should 
be guided, henceforth, only by nalionalism. TI1ey are not only guides on 
the path leading to God: "May they work together with the foremost citi-
zens and with the eiders for the salvation of Albanian language and Alba-
nian people, for knowledge and culture of the nation and fatherland, and 
for ail progress and well-being". 
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the rationalism of Voltaire, \vere aimed to provide the theoreti-
cal foundation of Albanian national movement. Even though 
often formulated in Bektashi and Sufi terms, Frashëri's pan-
theism was strengthened in its social content and intentional 
tendency, as an expression of contest in opposition to Sunni 
orthodoxy and its Ottoman stronghold and, hence, as an ideo-
logical argument in promoting the libera ting and emancipatory 
ideas of Albanian national movement. 
Nairn Prashëri was not a unique leader, but the quality of 
his verse together with his olher nationalist and educational 
activities placed him at the forefront of the avant-garde of Al-
banian national movement. He became defender of Bektashism 
not merely because of any personal special link or conviction 
but by means of Bektashism he could better proclaim his con-
test credo in opposition to Ottoman occupation. As long as the 
Ottoman p.olitical power coincided in ideological level to Is-
lamic religion, ail deviation from dogmatic and orthodox Is-
lam was assumed to take on a political meaning of opposition. 
By the same token, by vohmtarily putting forward and even 
downrightly developing this very character, he aimed to bring 
Bektashism doser to his own theory of nationalism. 
To this extent, Albanian nationalism and the construction 
of the Albanian nation could not be by any means an offspring 
emanating exclusively from Bektashism, as sorne specialists in 
the area, probably limited by the narrow contours of the very 
object of their studies, have hastily and uncritically daimed.76 
Of course, Abdyl Frashëri, elder brother of the poet and promi-
nent leading member of the League of Prizren (1878-1881) 
which was the crucial episode toward Albanian independence, 
belonged to the Bektashis. It is also a generally held opinion 
7~ (Clayer 2002: 103-135) 
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that the Bektashis played a significant rote in the movement of 
'national awakening' (Rilindja) in Albania from 1878 onwards. 
Actually, a great number of Bektashi leaders, in spite of a short-
lived alliance with the Ymmg Turks, firmly adopted national-
ist ideas. 
This might be, however, another instance of the instrumen-
tal myths surrounding the Bektashis, for it is weil known from 
other sources that most of the Bektashi fmmdations in Albania 
were established at the tum of the twentieth century, when a 
renaissance of the order took place rather as a restùt of the 
national move:ment. It is above ali since the last decade of nine-
teenth century that the Bektashis actually started to be very 
active in the development of both ctùtural and national move-
ment in south and central Albania, which must have paved 
the way for their extraordinarily popularjty in Albania and 
the subsequent introduction of elements of nationalist ideal-
ogy into their religious doctrine. 
It seems reasonable therefore to consider that it is the new 
Albanian Bektashism th.at might have become the offspring of 
Albanian national movement, especially after the influential 
elaboration of its heretical doctrines instilled by Naim Frashëri, 
much in the same way as Kizilbash ideology once became the 
instrument of Safavid policy against Ottoman power in early 
sixteenth century. In turn, like the later development of 
Kizilbash-Alevi politics in Turkey, Bektashisrn in Albania has 
been often idealized as one of embodiments of the Albanian 
Volksgeist, which Bektashi leaders must have exploited later in 
a deliberate instrumental politics to make Bektashi ideas at-
tractive among non-Bektashis who could swell the ranks of 
the Order while contributing to the creation of an autonomous 
and, later, independent or even communist Albania. 
That is why the continuous emphasis on the historical con-
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nection of the Bektashis with Ali Pasha proved to be still in-
strumentally effective, for the large autonorny that he gained, 
or the prefiguration of a first Albanian national State that he 
was supposed to have founded, corresponded to the aims or 
ideals of the Bektashi leaders al the tirne of the Albanian na-
tional mobilization. Much more, in the process of creating a 
national history from the viewpoint of the Bektashis, Ali Pasha 
came to be considcred as the second hero of the na ti on, after 
Skanderbeg, while both came to be presented as belonging to 
the Bektashi arder. Having been cducated in the Sultan's court, 
Skanderbeg was related to the Janissary corps and therefore 
supposed to have been a Bektashi. One of the prominent Alba-
ruan Bektashi leaders, Baba Ali Tomorri in his History of the 
Bektnshis,77 mnkes the fight of Skanderbeg a part of the first 
stmggle of the Bektashis against the Ottoman Sultans. 
Such myths, like those forged cartier by Bektashi ideology in 
relation to Ottoman polity/8 were ali the more instrumental as 
the proto-national character generally attributed to both 
Skanderbeg's and Ali Pasha's poli lies, and the necessity to stress 
the former's Christian character or to diminish the latter's 
Muslim character, corresponded to the strong denigration of 
Islam in the laicizing framework of the independent Albanian 
s tate, while the image of the Bektashis rernained a liberal and 
nationaHst one. tt is perhaps for the same reason that, later, 
bath King Zog and Enver Hoxha will be sornetirnes believed to 
be of Bektashi origin.7'~ ln such a way, like their former fellows 
in Ottoman Empire, the Bektashis will reassert their contribu-
tion to the construction of the Albanian nation and anticipate 
political benefit. 
77 {Turabiu 1929} 
78 (Doja 2006) 
79 (Norton 2001: 19-1; Clayer 2002: 155-156) 
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POLIT! CAL PROJECTS AND 
RELIGIOUS SPECULATION 
It was tmder the political patronage of independent Alba-
nia, however, that Bektashism, recognized by the highest gov-
ernmental authorities as an established denomination, came 
to be a nationally and internationally structured ecclesiastic 
institution. The Bektashi leader was granted an ex-offkio seat 
in the legislative National Assembly in 1914 and they had an 
institutionally recognized representative in the highest ftmc-
tion of the State. The High Council of the Regency of indepen-
dent Albania was composed of four rather than three mem-
bers, representing each of the country's denominations: Sunni 
Muslims, Orthodox Christians, Catholics, and Bektashis. In this 
way, Albanian Bektashis ceased to be considered as conven-
tional adherents of Islam and were regarded, rather, as an in-
dependent religious congregation. 
This political evolution of Bektashism in Albania was nm 
parallel with another development in matters of organization. 
Àfter the independence of Albania in 1912, ties with the 
Bektashi world centre in Anatolia, and the order's hierarchy 
in Turkey were slowly eut down. Another reason was the gen-
eral dismissal of mystic orders in modem Turkey and their de-
finitive abolition in 1925. Recogrtized by the new Albanian State 
as one of the accepted religions of the country, the Bektashis 
continued their activities independently in Albania in confor-
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rnity to a printed set of regulations. lt is hardly stuprising that 
from that time onwards the Albanian Bektashis took steps to 
establish in Tirana the order's world centre. Finally, with the 
initiative of the order's head Salih Niyazi Dede, in his capacity 
of Arch-grandfather and supreme pontiff of ail the Bektashis, 
the seat of the Order, formerly in the central tekke at Hacibektash 
Village in Anatolia, was ach1ally transferred in a purpose-built 
head-lodge in Tirana, the capital of Albania. 
Already the Bektashis obeyed to a rigorous and severe rank 
of hierarchy more than any ether Sufi Order, and the whole 
system of lodges was hierarchically ranked in relation to each 
other,80 which militated to increasingly concentrate rich en-
dowment of estates. Because of the explicit political circum-
stances in the reality of independent Albania, the organization 
of the Order became increasingly struchlred, improving its 
rnethods of recruitment of followers and the appointrnent of 
its lùerarchy, especially in matters of celibacy and non-heredi-
tary offices. Albanian Bektashism actually adopted a hierar-
chical organization in which the rank held by a member was 
graded and lùs status conformed to his seniority and the pro-
portion and degree of his commitrnent and loyalty. 
As specialists show through abundant documentary evi-
dence,81 the hierarchical pattern of the organizational stmc-
ture of Bektashism in Albania reached a very peculiar expres-
sion not only in terminological, local terrns, but also in a more 
sophisticated and clear-cut ecclesiastical as well as political 
hierarchy, which perhaps surpassed limits observed in Otto-
man context. Between 1921 and 1950 the Albanian Bektashis 
organized five congresses to accomplish the change of an Ot-
!10 (Halimi 2000) 
Hl (Popovic 1986; Clayer 1990: 47-67) 
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toman dervish arder towards a religious congregation of the 
new Albamian Nation. According to the 1950 stahtte of Alba-
ruan Bektashis, the order must also serve as an umbrella orga-
nization for ether Sufi communities in the country. 
Certainly, this final stage of the hierarchical and central-
ized orga:nization coincided not only with the establislunent of 
religious and political power but also with tightening of state 
control over religious matters. Actually, not only in 1930 the 
Arch-grandfather was appointed to his position by the newly 
crowned King of Albania and the Bektashi stahltes were regu-
larly approved by the Alba:nian govemment, but the political 
regime sought every time the support of instituted Bektashism 
as that of ether religions denominations, and even took the 
initiative of imposing and controlling their doctrinal orthodoxy 
and hierarchical organization. Ail kind of intimidations were 
used to this end, and it is by no means a mere coïncidence that 
every time that a new regime came to power in Albania the 
highest l1evel of Bektashi hierarchy suffered internai cabinet 
reshuffles, even leading to repeatedly mysterious murders. 
The Bektashis daim, for instance, that Arch-grandfather 
Salih Niyazi Dede was murdered in 1941 by the Italian fascist 
regime of occupation because he didn't accept collaboration. 
Later, after the advent of the communists in power, while the 
statute of 1945 showed clear opposition against Communist 
leadership, internai strife within the Bektashis escalated in 
March 1947 when Arch-grandfather Abaz Hilmi Dede shot 
dead killing his two assistants Baba Fqja Marta:neshi and Fejzo 
Dervishi. Because they were loyal towards the Communist re-
gime, it is believed they had demanded the arder to collabora te 
more closely with the com.munists while accusing the Arch-
grandfatlher of being a reactionary. Not surprisingly current 
Bektashi leaders will again present a different version which 
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must fit better to modem structuring tendencies of the order. 
According to Baba "Mondi" from the Arch-grandfather's See 
in Tirana, Baba Faja Martaneshi was killed because he had 
viola ted the ml es of the Bektashi order by being married and 
having a son (sic!).82 This version is of course questioned by 
others who claim that Baba Faja Martaneshi died tmder very 
suspicious ci.rcumstances, with Enver Hoxha hi.mselfbeing sus-
pected to have ordered his assassination.83 After trus incident, 
however, the Arch-grandfather was forced to commit suicide, 
and repression against non-loyal Bektashi members started. The 
order was totally put under govemment control with Ahmed 
Myftar Dede, a loyal follower .of Communist doctrines, ap-
pointed as Arch-grandfather and staying in office until 1958.84 
In fact, apart from the dangers of religious leaders revolting 
against established authority, which cotùd orùy be successftù 
under special conditions, there is always the possibility of their 
direct intervention in state affairs. Consequently the political 
authorities, weil aware of thei.r potentialities rooted as they are 
in the lives of the masses, often seek to control, regulate, and 
conciliate them rather than to suppress them. The Albanian 
commtmist regime, like the Ottoman govemment in the past 
and not tmlike the energetic Ali Pasha in his time, was able to 
deal with alrnost all religious groups by playing off the more 
influential against each other. 
Finally, with the increasing power of commtmist ideology 
in Albania, ail religions were rendered purely and si.rnply un-
82 (Kressing 2002: 79) 
83 (Hysi 2003) 
64 Much more recently, in the time of post-communist transition, it was the 
head of the Orthodox Church that was expelled with a deportation arder 
while the head of the lslamic Association has been murdered a gain in what 
sorne believe was an assassination by the fundamentalist faction to gain 
control of the direction of Islam in Albania. 
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necessary, and were abolished in 1967 In tum, thcse trials and 
tribulations created new conditions for Albanian Bektashism 
to become once again the religion of victims of persecution. 
The Bektashis in Egypt and Turkey, constituting a clandestine 
movement, declared their independence from the Albanian 
world centre and elected in 1949 Ahmed Sirri Baba as head of 
the order in the tekke of Cairo. Likewise in Michigan where 
Frances Trix also found her master,85 Baba Rexhebi founded 
the Bektashi tekke of Detroit in 1954. But once again after the 
downfall of communism in Albania, Bektashism re-emergcd 
in its full great pomp in the 1990. They held their first formal 
assembly in June the same year and established the new Arch-
grandfather Haxhi Dede Reshat Bardhi in their former 'holy 
see' in Tirana, renovated with financial aid from Bektashi com-
patriots abroad. Its formai reopening was attended by Mother 
Theresa - another staunch orthodox of Albanian stock - and 
other distinguished gttests. Also, rather than "mildly arnusing" 
in view of the anti-Bektashi stance of orthodox Muslims,86 it is 
by no means accidentai that this reopening was hailed by the 
staunch Stmni press in Turkey as a triurnph for Islam. 
However, the Bektashis are still trying to redefine themselves 
politically in the limited space left to them by Sunni Muslims. 
Their main aspiration is to maintain public recognition of their 
Order as 'Lhe fourth religion' in Albania, that is, as a tradi-
tional denomination with official status in the State. For this 
purpose they developed a close relationship with the newly 
formed government of President Bcrisha's democratie party 
(1992-1997), taking part in his political campaigns, despite the 
vagaries of political changes when the coming to power of so-
115 (frix 1993) 
86(Norton 2001: 199) 
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cialist opposition's government (1997-2005) might have made 
their policy temporarily counterproductive. 
More importantly, it is increasingly becoming dearer that 
the version of Bektashism which is being developed in post-
communist Albania, rather than reject the links with Iran that 
were formerly part of Bektashi history, welcomes them, and 
has forged links with the modem Iranian state. Iranians, like 
Saudi Arabians, came in Albania after the fall of Communism 
in the 1990s with irnpressive budget and are now the most 
active of Islamic missionaries who have succeeded in rallying 
a number of intellectuals, especially of the older generation. 
Not surprisingly, they are more successful in recruiting mem-
bers of the former Communist Party than independent intel-
lectuals. Apparently those who had put their faith in Commu-
nism feel a great vacuum of power opportunities when the 
ideology was discredited. Indeed, not only they are more open 
to look for another ideology to replace the old one, but they are 
also motivated by more worldly reasons such as large salaries 
paid by Iran and other Muslim countries and many business 
opporh.tnities with foreign investors. In tum, Muslirn propa-
gandists have succeeded in creating somehow a nucleus of 
Albanian Muslims sharing their strict view of orthodox Islam, 
which remains nevertheless a partial success limited to sorne 
trrban settings only, for the bulk of rural population is quite 
resistant to this version of Islam. 
Although Bektashis are not orthodox Shiites, Iran is very 
active in supporting them. A good example of promoting Ira-
ruan political and diplomatie objectives is the creation of the 
influential Saadi Shirazi Fotmdation. While in practice the f01m-
da tion is part of the Iranian Embassy and is believed to be a 
cover for the Iranian secret services, the official purpose is to 
promote Persian culture and lslarnic values. The single aim of 
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the irnpressive translation and publication programmes and 
other research and ctùtural activities is to link Muslirns in Al-
bania to Iran. Under the pretext of reviving 'the great Islamk 
culture that Albania has inherited', Iranians finance ali sorts 
of historical and sociological research aimed at demonstrating 
that Albania is part of the Islarnic world. In a way, this policy 
helps to revive the particular Ottoman and Oriental legacy in 
Albania. Ctùtural production of this kind is mostly ideological, 
however, aimed among other things at showing that Albanian 
nationalism and Islam are not contradictory insofar as the na-
tionalist ideology is believed to be grounded in the Bektashi 
and other tolerant traditions of progressivist Islam. 
Currently, the Albanian Bektashis have an ambiguous sta-
tus which places them somewhere in the middle between the 
three official religions and the other religious minorities. Simi-
lar to the Sunni Muslims, the Orthodox Christians and the 
Catholics, the state recognizes their existence de facto. Their 
spiritualleader participa tes in ali state ceremonies, and recently 
the Nevmz holiday on March 22 was declared to be an official 
holiday, because it coincides with the Day of Democracy. They 
have, however, no right to have their own representative in 
the State Secretariat of religions and ali their activities are placed 
under the supervision of the Sunni Association. 
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TOWARD ORTHODOX IDEOLOGY 
From almost all documentary accounts the important fact 
can be shown that Bektashi conceptions, particularly at the 
critical periods of Kizilbash movements in Ottoman Anatolia 
and Alevi movements in Modem Turkey or national movement 
in Albarùa, appear extremely heterodox and heretical. In ad-
dition, many discursive interactions in Bektashl narrativesl 
poetry, and adages show a coherence of linkages progressing 
from the outer to inward, that is, as Frances Trix pointed out,87 
from a more Sunrù or orthodox Islam to the decidedly mystic 
Sufi conceptions, apparently because Sufism or lslamic mysti-
cism could only progress from the outer Sunni form to an in-
ner Sufi meaning. The Bektashi world of discourse can be seen 
then as a legitimizing strategy in which a later relationship not 
sanctioned by Orthodox Islam, seeks legitimacy by being re-
lated to one of the basic relationships of Islam. Actually, Sunrù 
Islam is often considered to be a cloak covering the essential 
Shiite and pantheistic character of the Bektashi faith, and the 
general opinion assumes that the Bektashis entirely neglected 
the religious performances required by the Sharia.88 However, 
my assumption is that the part Sunni Islam played in Bektashi 
87(Trix 1993: 33-34) 
SSWhen the Bektashis do affirm, for example, the importance of Sunni injunc-
tion to ri tuais, they understand true ri tuais (namaz) not as mere superfidal 
practice but rather esoteric symbols of justice and goodness, giving em-
phasis to s incerity of fa1th and not to the religion's outward observances. 
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life and thought is more important than it appears. 
The fact that the Bektashis were rarely attacked on grounds 
of doctrine or innovations is directly related to their associél· 
tion with the Janissaries and the Ottoman authority. ln its Ot· 
toman heydays, maintaining a strong central organization, 
Bektashism even claimed to be a Sunni order,89 in spite of its 
very tmorthodox and Shiite tendencies. No wonder thereby 
that the officiais of the order clearly handed over their loyalty 
to the Stmna of the Prophet as a necessary stage in their code 
of discipline. More importantly, as generallywithin institutional 
Sufism, from the moment the religious Bektashis leaders felt 
the need to support their statements with prophetie sayings, 
they a Iso felt it necessary to express conformity with the Sharia, 
the revealed Law of orthodox Islam, which coincided with their 
growing conformity to the legal establishment. 
As a restùt, the mystical content of the order weakened. In 
fact, every time the order approached the establishment of or-
thodox political powers, whether in Ottoman as in Modern 
Turkey or in independent Albania, its hierarchical and cen-
They believe that salvation exists in emulating such perfect models as Aü, 
Hadji Bektash, and other saints. Everyone must seek 'purity of heart' and 
self-awareness, but piety is measured by lifestyle and nol by ritual. Their 
'three conditions' of speech, action and moral containment (eline diline 
beline) are a succinct statement of an overall orientation that imp}jes very 
strongly thal it is through continuai striving for perfection in worldly 
moral conduct thal divine approval will ensue. 
Again they lake true fast of Ramadan not as exempt of material food 
but rather a spiritual cleaning of heart from the evil, as they take true 
pilgrimage not a physical journey to Mecca but rather a spiritual journey to 
the heart. In the same way, the order of describing the hierarchical chains 
in which the Bektashi conception of d.ivinity is stmctured parallels again 
the outer to inward paradigms from the more general Sufi to the more 
particular Bektashi. 
89(Trimingham 1971 [1998]: 80; Norris 1993: 89) 
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tralized organization also corresponded to a doctrinal radical-
ism. It is by no means accidentai that the sources emphasize 
over and over again that a certain eminent Bektashi took the 
Sharia seriously, pro~ing that as long as the desire for power 
of the orthodox postulates its own position as absolute, the 
educational attitudes of the Bektashis will necessarUy follow 
suit. Order leaders vied with one another in demonstrating their 
loyalty and subservience to legalistic Islam, and in the process 
Bektashism were emptied of its essential elements and left with 
the empty husks of mystical terminology, disciplines, and ex-
ercises. 
To illustrate, from Albanian Bektashis there are known two 
seventeenth-century manuscripts written in Turkish, in which 
it is interesting to notice how the language, in contrast with 
both earlier and later manuals, is unusually wrapped m the 
flowery Sunni orthodox vocabulary, often ambiguous, but ap-
pearing sometimes as a forced disguise to ali outward appear-
ances of Sunni orthod oxy. 90 More importan tly, it can be showed 
that in these texts there is an effort to comply with the dogma 
of orthodox Sunni Islam even in respect to features of a cat-
egorically Sufi and Shiite nature. I believe the explanation of 
this attitude is ta be found in the context of a more hierarchical 
development of the Bektashi internai organization, in connec-
tian with the historical and political conditions of Albania in 
the period of the texts' composition. In seventeenth century, as 
political power in the Ottoman world was overwhelmingly in 
the hands of orthodox Muslims, Sunni images were the grounds 
of legitimacy. 
In these conditions, Bektashi leaders were seeking to subject 
the mystical element to Islamic standards, to make mysticism 
'lO(Guidetti 1998: 264) 
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innocuous by tolerating much of its outer aspects and forms in 
retum for submission. They increasingly strived in reprimand-
ing several colorations of mysticism and fanaticism, trying to 
bring followers back to more respect for fundamental lslamic 
rtùes. Up to the present day, there are many who vigorously 
reject criticism that the Order and its doctrines are against the 
beliefs of Islam and that otherwise Bektashi dervishes would 
only make prejudice to Islam, hiving themselves off from the 
genuine Islamic teachings. 
Religious scholars warn, in partinùar, against the belief in 
the incarnation of God in human form, the transcendental 
annulment in God, and the cult mysticism mistaking the mas-
ter for God. They try to defend Bektashism from ali accusa-
tions of heterodoxy or liberalism and consider it identical with 
the normal understandings of legalist Sunni Islam, stressing its 
missionary role and transmissory links militating against doc-
trinal deviations of any kind. 
A frequent point of friction, as with the case of ether der-
vish sects of extremist Shiite inclinations,91 are the beliefs of 
reincarnation (tenasuh), the idea of the transmigration of seuls 
which implied a belief in transformation and the multiplicity 
of forms, and the credo of emanation which eventually becomes 
'manifestation' of God in human form (tecelli). Specialists may 
notice that the theory of emanation and belief in reincarnation 
are not un.iform and not an important theme in Bektashi teach-
ing, and that according to groups and periods, one or another 
of the strands predominates.92 There is general agreement on 
the conditions in which the animistic belief in the transmigra-
tion of souls came about in Turkic mystical and heterodox 
91(Moosa 1988) 
92(Norton 2001: 177-178; Zarcone 2005: 40) 
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circles, as it is on the character of Alevi-Bektashi groups in 
which these beliefs became firmly rooted. There is no attempt, 
however, to understand why in practice sorne other individu-
ais or groups do not accept or clearly deny such beliefs. 
While marginal heterodox and nonconformist influences are 
admitted, 1 believe it is the most conservatory trend in the de-
velopment of Bektashism that daims that these opinions make 
an amalgam between moderate Bektashi and extreme Shiite 
views, in arder to protect Bektashi religious identity from such 
distortions that would make it appear hostile to the founder of 
Islam and to Islam altogether. Actually, in the course of argu-
ment, Bektashism is said to have been 11misused and misun-
derstood by destabilizing forces and currents hostile to Islam 
soàety during nineteenth century", which eventually did cause 
its disgrace in 1826.93 Authoritative assertions come thereby to 
daim that the Bektashl religions system, as a doctrine and prac-
tice, "is closely connected with the intemal development of Is-
lam as a religion" and that its "indisputable ideological and 
philosophical basis is Islam". lnsofar as it adheres to the two 
basic Islamic postula tes - faith in the unity of Allah and the . 
messenger mission of Muhammad - "we cannat consider its 
history and philosophy in isolation from Islam" .94 
After ali, indeed, "the Order that had enjoyed the full sup-
port of Ottoman power cannat be thought outside the funda-
mental values of Islam".95 That is wh y, in Bektashi circles, Hadji 
Bektash is increasingly presented as a good Muslim, respectful 
of the prescripts of Islam, and according to a late tradition, 
even as a descendant of the Prophet.96 Espeàally in the period 
93(Izeti 2001: 53-55) 
~(Gramatikova 2001: 600) 
95(lzeti 2001: 55) 
'li> (Melikoff 2001: 121-133) 
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of independent Albania, representatives of the hierarchy of 
Albanian Bektashi clergy reacted against assertions that often 
tended to coru;ider the order of Bektashis as a doctrine of strong 
heterodoxy, diverging from orthodox Sunni Islam much more 
than other Muslim orders. Not surprisingly, they kept up a cer-
tain appearance of respect for the law of Sharia, drawing on 
the traditional tenets that the spiritual way of tariknt must nec-
essarily go th:rough the legal gate of the sheriat. 
The simple traditional Bektashi discussion of the Sherint ga te-
way to religious knowledge takes therefore on a different mean-
ing. Traditionally the Bektashis have built into their religion such 
flexibility that it is quite acceptable for them to follow the precepts 
of Sunni Islam when they find it expedient to do so. Such a dual 
orientation is not just a practical solution to external religious pres-
sure. It also pmvides a way for the particular and preferred inter-
pretation of Bektashism as an established religion to be linked to 
the wider body of orthodox history and theology that they regard 
as being charatderistic of Islam. Furthermore, this is more impor-
tant than it miight sound, because it denotes very clearly the way 
for individuals, or groups, to explore such orthodox practiœ, not 
just 11if they feel such inclination'' in Shankland's characteriza-
tion/7 but essimtially when they see the opporhuùty for gaining 
authority andl political benefit in doing so. 
Birge, for example, witnessed tha t sever al evenings as he 
satin the guest-room of the head of the Bektashi Order in Al-
bania, he saw outside the window a dervish stepping on to the 
veranda and giving the evening cali to prayer. When, in sur-
prise, he asked the reason for this he was told that this was the 
sheriat part.98 Still today a certain faction of Alevi writers in 
97(Shankland 2003: 86) 
96 (Birge 1937 [1994]: 107) 
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Turkey will often quote individual Koranic verses as an appeal 
for authority to support thcir vicw on a given topic orto justify 
a certain Alevi religious tradition, a trend which is becoming 
increasingly typical for Sufi scholars in their struggle for legiti-
macy.99 
Within this type of development a new reverence for the 
Prophet is also associated, which not merely brought hlm into 
the category of wonder-workers at the popular level, but also 
led to the doctrine of the pre-existence of Mohammad before 
creation and to the popular equivalent of the belief in the Spirit 
of Mohammad as the Logos, guardian,' and preserver of the 
universe. The celebration of the Prophet's birthday seems, at 
!east in part, to have been already a compensation for the sup-
pression of Ali demonstrations after the destruction of Shiite 
regimes. 100 
In Bektashism as in certain other dervish orders, the cult of 
Ali, carried to an extreme, was a major cause of friction. The 
cult of Ali in the dervish orders was exaggerated to a degree 
intolerable to the orthodox mind, especially since in extreme 
cases it culminated in his deifi~ation, or in any case, in a venera-
tion detrimental to that of the Prophet. For orthodox Islam, 
Muhammad and Ali are human beings and they cannot be of 
divine essence. In a much symmetrical but inverse relation, for 
the doctrine of Trinity in Catholic orthodoxy there cannot be 
any hierarchical projection within a divine essence. Now, as 
Christian heresy pursue a doctrine of Docetism that refuses Trin-
ity and denies the fusion of divinity and human nature as .in-
separably united and fully achieved in the person of Christ, .in a 
symmetric .inversed relationship, the divinity of Mohammed and 
99(A recent case in point is Douglas-Klotz 2005) 
1110(Trimingham 1971 [1998]: 27) 
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Ali is obviously a very extremist and heretic Shiite concept. 
In the history of Christianity the recognition of Jesus Christ's 
divinity seemed to threaten Christian m.onotheism, while the 
denial of his divinity put salvation in doubt. Hence the doc-
trine of Trinity represented the radical reformtùation of the 
doctrine of Godhead to meet the demands of Christian faith. lt 
was formulated in the Nicene Council called in the fourth cen-
tury by the Byzantine Emperor Constantine, and became since 
the formal statement of orthodox Christian belief. In striking 
similarity~ Balim Sultan, the great reformer of the Bektashi Or-
der appointed in the sixteenth century by the Ottoman Stùtan 
Bayezid II, is sa id to have formalized the belief system that pro-
pounded the concept of trinity peculiar to Bektashism,101 which 
is still in force amongst current authoritarian leaders of the 
Order. 
Baba Rexhebi, for instance, the influential leader of the Al-
banian Bektashi fotmdation of Michigan, in one of his treatises 
on Bektashism, makes a clear distinction between the triune 
Bektashi conception of divinity comprising inseparably the 
Ultirnate Truth-Reality of God, Muhammad and Ali, while 
militating against the heretic and heterodox traditions in 
Bektashi conceptions regarding the divinity of Ali. Furthermore, 
he once again maintained that the order respects the rituals of 
faith and insisted that Bektashi rituals are not in opposition to 
Sunni Islam, that Bektashisrn is "within Islam" and, sornetimes, 
that it is even the "real" Islam.102 Allegations of this kind, fer-
vently clairned by religious scholars,103 or naively justified by 
seemingly well-intentioned local scholars,104 may weil be no-
101(Norton 2001: 171) 
102 (Rexhebi 1970) 
103 (Izeti 2001: 53-55) 
1 ~ (Rexhepagiqi 1999: 258) 
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ticed by area specialists,105 but without necessârily explaining 
- nor indeed understanding at ali - that a deep evolution had 
been already achieved, not only in organizational and political 
structures, but also in theological and religious conceptions. 
When during the Conununist period, Baba Rexhebi escaped 
to the United States where he fmmded the Bektashi lodge of 
Detroit, he came in contact with more sophisticated types of 
Sufism, read in English the works of Western Orientalists, spe-
cifically French Orientalist Henry Corbin,106 and understood 
that to survive Bektashism would need togo through a drastic 
revision. In his theological treatise he tried to put Bektashism 
in the perspective of Muslim mysticism and relate it to other 
more elabora te forms of Sufism. In particular, he demonstrated 
that Bektashism is dosely related ta Iranian Shiism, and he tried 
to dismiss the shamanistic and pre-Islamic influences in order 
to bring Bektashism back onto the pa th of Shiite orthodoxy. As 
this book is the only one of its kind available in the Albanian 
language, his work had a tremendous influence on Bektashis, 
even though the doctrines found in it differ greatly from the 
Bektashi traditions. 
There is no wonder afterwards that precisely his book opened 
the door to Iranianinfluence in post-conununist Albania, which 
is aimed at bringing ail the Bektashls back to the Shiite flock 
and hardening the orthodox line of the Order. Similarly, 
amongst the different factions competing for political audience 
in Turkey after the revival in the 1990s, there is a reformula-
tian of Bektashi-Alevism in connection with Iranian Shiism that 
sometimes has reached a quite different conclusion of the most 
taken for granted way of evolution. It is increasingly becoming 
105 (Ciayer 1990: 77-78; Norris 1993: 94) 
Lœ(e.g. Corbin 1971, 1979, 1982, 1983) 
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clearer that a certain version of Alevism, rather than reject the 
links with Iran that were formerly part of Bektashi history, 
welcomes them, and has forged links with the modem Iranian 
state. 
Indeed, instead of the traditionallocalleaders, they already 
regard themselves bound to spirintalleaders who are sent from 
lran. From them, they learn a form of Shüsm that insists on the 
veiling of women, on men and women worshipping apart, and 
upon the importance of the Sheriat. Rather than reject masques, 
thls movement appears to create or build Shiite masques which 
act as centres of religious activity in a way that is tmusual in 
Bektashi tradition. While active in West Emope, particularly 
in Germany, it is also said to influence the Alevi villages in 
Turkey.107 In this case, it appears that the segregating, puri-
tanical elements of orthodox practice have come to the fore, 
and once more with an emphasis on the subordination of 
women. The result appears to be a religious revolutionary spirit 
that is as potètllially aggressive as any o!:her form of funda-
mentalism. 
Similar development, especially with regard to Iranian in-
fluence, can be clearly singled out in the case of Bektashism in 
Albania. Iranians, like Saudi Arabians, came in Albania after 
the fall of Communism in the 1990s with impressive budget 
and are now the most active of Islarnic missionaries who have 
succeeded in rallying a number of intellech1als, especially of 
the older generation. Not surprisingly, they are more success-
ful in recruiting members of the former Comnumlst Party than 
independent intellecruals. Apparently those who had put their 
faith in Conununism .feel a great vacuum of power opportuni-
ties when the ideology was dlscredited. lndeed, not only they 
107(Shankland 2003: 169) 
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are more open to look for another ideology to replace the old 
one, but they are also motivated by more worldly reasons such 
as large salaries paid by Iran and other Muslim countries and 
many business opportunities with foreign investors. ln tum, 
Muslim propagandists have succeeded in creating somehow a 
nucleus of Albanian Muslims sharing their strict view of or-
thodox Islam, which remains nevertheless a partial success lim-
ited to sorne urban settings only, for the bulk of rural popula-
tion is quite resistant to this version of Islam. 
Although Bektashis are not orthodox Shütes, Iran is very 
active in supporting them. A good example of promoting Ira-
nian political and diplomatie objectives is the creation of the 
influential Saadi Shirazi Foundation. In practice, according to 
sorne scholars,108 the foundation is believed to be a cover for 
the Iranian secret services, even though the official purpose is 
to promote Persian culture and Islarnic values. The single aim 
of the impressive translation and publication programmes and 
other research and cultural activities is to link Muslims in Al-
bania to Iran. Under the pretext of reviving 'the great Islamic 
culhue that Albania has inherited', Iranians finance ali sorts 
of historical and sociological research airned at demonstrating 
that Albania is part of the Islamic world. In a way, this policy 
helps to revive the particular Ottoman and Orientallegacy in 
Albania. Cultural production of this kind is mostly ideological, 
however, aimed arnong other things at showing that Albanian 
nationalism and Islam are not contradictory insofar as the na-
tionalist ideology is believed to be grounded in the Bektashl 
and other tolerant traditions of progressivist Islam. 
ln turn, such a mystification allows Iranians to seize the 
opporh.uùty of bringing the Bektashis back to the Shiite flock 
108(Lakshman-Lepain 2002) 
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and hardening the orthodox line of Bektashism. Among other 
things, a significant number of new Albanian Bektashi der-
vishes are also sent to Iran at the Theological Faculty of the 
Holy City of Qom for religious trainin:g. It is probable that wh en 
they return to Albania they will be: much doser to Iranian 
Shiism than Bektashism ever was. 
Once again specialists may touch upon these recent 
conflictual developments within Bektashism. After the 6th Con-
gress of the Albanian Bektashis in Tiirana, for instance, grow-
ing opposition is noticed among the remaining Bektashis in 
Macedonia and Kosova as well as immigrant Bektashi com-
munities in Western Europe and overseas against Arch-grand-
father Reshat Bardhi in Tirana. Yet, quite simplistically, there 
is no other explanation offered than a supposed weakness of 
the current leader of the Bektashis, who unlike his energetic 
predecessors, seems to be only "an 01ld man with .little educa-
tion" who "lacks the vision necessary for the movement's sur-
vival".109 
109(Lakshman-Lepain 2002: 54) 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The establishment of dervish orders can be considered as 
the organized form of mysticism, and the psychological affin-
ity between rnys_ticism and pantheism, related as much to du-
alist and gnostic conceptions as to the Shiite devotion to Ali 
has been pointed out. This is doubtless justified, but at the very 
starting moment of organization and systematization, there 
must be whether a split into different sects or a beginning lo 
create a new separate orthodoxy of its own.110 The moment of 
crisis wonld have come at that point, for mysticism does not 
allow itself to be pressed into a system originating in rational 
considerations. The contrast of any mysticism to its own or-
thodoxy, as far as it exists, as it does in the case of Bektashism, 
lies in the fact that mysticism is always based on a feeling of 
pantheistic wholeness, while any monotheism is the result of 
intellectual thought. The all-embracing sentiment relies on it-
self, while monotheisrn and any theism are the result of a search 
for the respective causes. The development of orthodoxy is 
airned precisely to overcome these irreconcilable differences. 
The overall mo del fin ally turns around a classic point of 
modem social anthropology that assumes that both culture and 
the social order are inculcated by the authority to which people 
have given their subservience and that those favoured by the 
110 (Kissling 1954: 25) 
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social order teach often successfully their own validation. An 
obvious instance wotùd be the way that religious leaders who 
are in a privileged position on top of the hierarchy tend to pro-
fess, and even insist upon, a world-view that maintains that 
hierarchy. They may teach that they are particularly favoured 
by God to fulfil that role, clairning thatt either holy writ or spiri-
tual knowledge ordains, even demands, their assuming a domi-
nant position. 
Basically, translated in sociologic.al terms, this means that 
the rigid, intolerant and authoritarian attitudes of the local re-
ligious dignitaries, as well as the formalism and dogmatism 
prevailing in ail fields, religious or political, simply express the 
haunting fear that they willlose their power. Within the politi-
cal system, as Levtzion has argued fm other contexts/ 11 Islam 
and religious ideology are by no means abstract concepts, but 
represent different social groups competing to extend their in-
fluence over political authority. A re:ügious leader might react 
first against established authority out of personal or factional 
interest or ambition, or he might be a channel for the expres-
sion of social discontents. Yet very s;oon leaders of heterodox 
movements will often aspire to politi,cal power. NormaUy, reli-
gions leaders from local hagiocracies .sooner or la ter will evolve 
into pillars of the established order a.nd the society at large. 
Every Church, having been a sect itself at its begin.nings, 
that is, a movement of social and r'eligious protest breaking 
with society at large, ends up being reconciled with the latter. 
As Bryan Wilson has argued, the firs1t stage of this process nor-
mally occurs at the second generation of members. Character-
istically, there is a loss of the original spontaneity in aU fields, 
the creation of professional rrùnistrie:s, the adoption of oaths, a 
'
11 (Levtzion 1979: 213) 
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positive attitude toward society at large and the acceptance of 
pluralism. This transformation parallels the access of members 
of the group to respectable social stahts, whereas the sects, 
originall)' very much in reaction against society at large, soon 
become estnblished when the second generation takes the reins, 
even though there will always be a first generation to be re-
cruited in a sect.112 
Protest may come within a recognized religious group and 
establish an ecclesiolrr in Ecclesia, a religious "way", collegium 
pietntis, characterized by mysticism as in the case of early 
Bektashism. But it may also lead to dissidence and factional-
ism, in which case we often observe the formation of ecclesias-
tic bodies of the Church type, or of serni-ecclesiastic bodies such 
as autonomie Churches or, again, of new sects to which eccle-
siastic and theological terminology will preferably referas ei-
ther schism or heresy, and recent political discourse as ftiDda-
rnentalisrn. 
In conclusion, I believe we must put the dialectics of devel-
opment of Bektashism into the same perspective as the reform-
ist vision of ail other 'revived forrns of Islam',113 whose prime 
ideal is the integration of religious and political authority, which 
implies an activist political concept of Islam. The active corn-
mitment cornes to destroy corrupt versions of Islam and bring 
into being an ideal Muslim commu.nity modelled on the ex-
ample of the Prophet. Such an ideal may spread fust in reli-
gions circles, but it makes soon a wide social impact, the re-
formers being particularly effective in organizing religious 
movements in transition societies. Many examples of reformist 
rnovements in lineage or tribal societies the world over did lead 
112 (Wilson 1990) 
113(Voll 1994) 
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this way to the formation of states dedicated to the integration 
of political and religious authority. 1'4 Similarly, the contempo-
rary Islal!Uc revival, the so-called fundamentalist movements 
are inspired by the vision of a prophetie community. They at-
tempt to return to the principles of Islarnic morality and to a 
renewal of personal comm.it:ment to the symbolic fmmdations 
of Islam. They commonly aim to control the state and to use 
the power of the state to enforce what is believed to be the true 
Islam. 
Still, the constant tension that subsists between orthodoxy 
and mystical movements is not exclusive to Islam. The polemic 
against sects and heterodox religious movements is primarily 
and essentially expressed in terms of conflict on doctrinal 
grounds. U the sociological perspective points to the economie 
and social roots of religious movements, it tends to underesti-
mate the importance of the religious structure itself. Up to now, 
the ideological and doctrinal field has been left exclusively in 
the hands of theologians, occasionally disputed by Orientalist 
and Medievalist historians. I have discussed elsewhere the par-
ticular affinity that sodologists and anthropologists have al-
ways shown between new religious movements and social, 
cultural and national crisis movements, as well as the extent to 
which religious ideas must be regarded either as a justification 
for liberationist movements or as an ideology justifying domi-
nation.m The analysis of doctrinal-ideological and structural-
organi.zational characteristics of Bektashism in Albanian con-
text that I presented here, is an illustrative suggestion that it is 
precisely on these structural and ideological grounds that such 
a dialectica1 correlation may be correctly addressed. 
11 ~ (Evans-Pritchard 1949; Geertz 1960; Peacock 1978) 
11s (Doja 2000a: 677-f:J79) 
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